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THE COMMUNITY SERVICE OBLIGATION
OF HILL-BURTON HEALTH FACILITIES"
KENNETH R. WING*
Financial barriers to adequate medical care are no longer a problem faced
by only low income Americans. Today, hospital bills sometimes amount to tens
of thousands of dollars.' Indeed, annual per capita spending on medical care
now exceeds $1,000.2 Even for those who can afford it, a typical medical in-
surance policy provides only limited coverage that ill-fits society's needs. 3 As
for the welfare recipient, the unemployed, or the working poor - people for
whom access to medical care has always been difficult - adequate medical
care is literally becoming financially inaccessible.
The problem of access to medical care in the United States, however, is
only partially defined in financial terms. People who can afford to pay for
medical treatment may find that other barriers to adequate health care exist.
Many hospitals require patients to have a personal physician on the hospital's
staff. Others demand pre-admission deposits before even emergency services
are performed. The consumer with a Medicaid or Medicare card will find that
for a variety of economic and non-economic reasons, many institutions are
reluctant to provide government-sponsored care and some simply refuse
altogether. In additi6n, discrimination against minorities, the handi-
capped, welfare recipients, and other "undesirables," continues disguised but
unabated in medical care institutions as in other aspects of American life.4
Those who are denied medical care for financial reasons, or because of
other institutional barriers, nevertheless may be guaranteed access to medical
facilities which have received federal funds for construction or modernization.
Legislation originally enacted by Congress in 19465 initiated a federal spending
program which provided funds for the capital development of a significant por-
tion of the nation's hospitals and other health facilities. 6 This program, com-
I Copyright @ 1982 by Boston College Law School.
* Assistant Professor, School of Law and School of Public Health, University of North
Carolina, Chapel Hill; J.D., Harvard Law School, 1971; M.P.H., Harvard School of Public
Health, 1972. The author would like to express his thanks for the research assistance of third year
law student Robert Strand.
I See generally Freeland, Colat, & Schlender, Projections of National Health Expenditures,
1980, 1985, 1990, 1 HEALTH CARE FINANCING REv. 1 (1980).
2 Id. at 12.
3 For an excellent discussion of the nature and extent of private health insurance
coverage, see A. SCHNEIDER, AN ADVOCATE'S GUIDE TO HEALTH CARE FINANCING 138-83
(1980).
4 See generally Institute of Medicine, National Academy of Sciences, HEALTH CARE IN
A CONTEXT OF CmiL RIGHTS (1981).
5 The Hospital Survey and Construction Act, Pub. L. No. 79-725, 60 Stat. 1040
(1946). This Act was the initial authorization for what has popularly been known as the Hill-
Burton program. See text at notes 40-55 infra for a discussion of later amendments.
6 As a financing program, Hill-Burton was remarkably successful. By 1974, over five
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monly known as the Hill-Burton program, was not intended only to provide
funding for the construction and modernization of medical institutions. As the
language of the authorizing legislation, its legislative history, and the overall
structure of the program demonstrate, Congress also intended that medical serv-
ices be provided in areas where they were especially needed and under condi-
tions designed to carry out specified congressional objectives.7
Both in its original form and as it was amended in the following three
decades, the Hill-Burton program was intended to achieve a number of
changes in the allocation and availability of health facility services by condi-
tioning receipt of federal funds on compliance with a variety of legislative con-
ditions. 8 Among the conditions explicitly included in the authorizing statute for
the program was a provision imposing specific obligations on both the state
agency administering the program and the recipient facility requiring the
facilities to provide: (a) a reasonable volume of uncompensated services and (b)
''community service," i.e., service to those who may be denied access to health
care for reasons other than lack of financial resources. 9 These "charity care"
obligations, as the two requirements have been frequently labeled, were an in-
tegral part of the original legislative scheme, as reflected both in the declaration
of purposes and throughout other provisions of the original legislation.10 In-
deed, the language of the original charity care obligations was specifically
amended into the original draft of the Hill-Burton legislation, apparently as
part of a political compromise to ensure broad-based congressional support for
the legislation, as will be explained in more detail below.1 Moreover, as the
Hill-Burton program expanded to include new funding mechanisms and addi-
tional categories of recipients, Congress continued to re-enact these obligations
as pre-conditions to funding. 12 Even when Congress terminated the program in
billion dollars in grants and loans had been spent on the nation's health facilities, assisting over
$14.5 billion worth of construction and modernization projects. Cambridge Research Institute,
TRENDS AFFECTING THE U.S. HEALTH CAPE SYSTEM 91-95 (1976) (commissioned by HEW).
See also figures cited in S. REP. No. 1285, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 14-18 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 7842-49.
Over 496,000 hospital and long term care facility beds received financial assistance
through the Hill-Burton program, roughly equivalent to 40% of the nation's current acute care
hospital bed supply. American Hospital Association, HOsPITAL STATISTICS: 1979 (1980). As a
major source of capital funds for hospitals and, to a lesser extent, other facilities, the federal Hill-
Burton program played an important role in underwriting the development of the existing health
care delivery system during three decades marked by rapid growth and systemic change. See
Wing & Craige, Health Care Regulation: Dilemma of a Partially Developed Public Policy, 57 N.C. L.
REv. 1165, 1169-72 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Wing & Craige].
7 See text and notes at notes 34-39 infra.
8 See text and notes at notes 36-50 infra.
9 See text at note 60 infra for the text of the statute.
10 See note 85 infra.
11 See note 75 infra.
12 The same requirements were imposed on recipients of funds under the expanded
program established in 1954. See Public Health Service Act 5 653(a), as amended by Pub. L. No.
83-482, § 2, 68 Stat. 461 (1954), later recodified along with preexisting S 633() in 1964. See notes
44-46 infra. For current codification, see 42 U.S.C. 5 291c(e) (1978). The requirements were also
[Vol. 23:577
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1974 the successor federal program attached virtually identical conditions13 on
receipt of funds. 14 Congress also explicitly mandated additional federal efforts
to insure rigorous enforcement of the charity care obligations imposed by the
original Hill-Burton program and the new program.
15
attached to the recipients of assistance under the loan funding authorized in 1964, see Public
Health Service Act § 610(a), as amended by Pub. L. No. 88-443, § 3, 78 Stat. 457 (1964), now
codified at 42 U.S.C. § 291j(b) (1978); and under the loan, loan guarantee and interest subsidy
programs established in 1970, see Public Health Service Act § 623(a), as amended by Pub. L. No.
91-296, § 201, 84 Stat. 346 (1970), now codified at 42 U.S.C. § 291j-3(a) (Supp. I 1978).
13 See notes 14 and 163 infra.
14 The National Health Planning and Resources Development Act of 1974 included
two provisions that created charity care obligations virtually identical to those included in the
original Hill-Burton legislation. Public Health Service Act § 1602(5),.§ 1604(b)(1)(J), as amended
by Pub. L. No. 93-641, § 4, 88 Stat. 2259 (1974). There are, however, two differences between
the charity care obligations imposed in 1974 and those that existed under Hill-Burton. First, §
1604(b)(1)(J) provides that "an application of any project shall set forth . . . reasonable
assurance that at all times after such application is approved (i) the facility or portion thereof to be
constructed, or modernized, or converted will be made available to all persons residing or
employed in the area served by the facility . . ." (emphasis added). The expression "at all
times" is not found in the Hill-Burton statutory language establishing the basis for the communi-
ty service or uncompensated service obligations. Whether "at all times" was intended to have
significance is not clear from the legislative history of the 1974 statute. The Department of
Health, Education and Welfare (HEW), however, had taken the position that this language re-
quires both charity care obligations to be imposed under the 1974 program for an unlimited dura-
tion, while the uncompensated service obligation of Hill-Burton facilities is limited to twenty
years' duration. See 42 C.F.R. § 124.501(b) (1980).
Second, the definition of community service in § 1604(b)(1)(J) of the 1974 legislation re-
quires availability to all persons "residing or employed" in the area of the facility, rather than
merely persons "residing" in the area, as the statutory authorization of the Hill-Burton com-
munity service obligation.
Section 1602(5) was subsequently repealed by the 1979 health planning amendments,
presumably to eliminate the slight differences between § 1602(5) and § 1604(b)(1)(J). See Pub. L.
No. 96-79, § 201, 93 Stat. 633 (1979). Section 1604(b)(1)(J) was redesignated § 1621(b)(1)(K)
and reauthorized by the same 1979 amendment. Id. at § 202. The net effect was that the charity
care obligations of recipients under the new program established in 1974 were unchanged by the
1979 amendments and remained virtually identical to those imposed on recipients under the Hill-
Burton program:
. . . an application for a medical facilities project . . . shall . . . set forth
reasonable assurance that at all times after such application is approved (i) the
facility or portion thereof to be constructed, modernized, or converted will be
made available to all persons residing or employed in the area served by the facili-
ty, and (ii) there will be made available in the facility, or portion thereof to be con-
structed, modernized, or converted a reasonable volume of services to persons
unable to pay therefor and the Secretary, in determining the reasonableness of the
volume of services provided, shall take into consideration the extent to which com-
pliance is feasible from a financial viewpoint.
42 U.S.C. § 300s-l(b)(i)(k) (Supp. III 1979).
15 Under Public Health Service Act § 1602(6), as amended by Pub. L. No. 93-641, 5 4, 88
Stat. 2258 (1974), HEW was required to issue regulations prescribing the manner in which the
assurances under both the Hill-Burton and the new 1974 program would be enforced and to col-
lect data concerning compliance:
5160 z. The Secretary shall by regulation
(6) prescribe the general manner in which each entity which receives finan-
cial assistance under this title or has received financial assistance title VI shall be
May 1982]
HeinOnline  -- 23 B.C. L. Rev. 579 1981-1982
BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW
While the uncompensated service obligation has been a subject of contro-
versy among the government, the hospital industry, and various consumer
groups for more than a decade, the community service obligation prior to 1979
had been virtually ignored. 16 In May of 1979, however, the Department of
Health, Education and Welfare (HEW) issued revised charity care regulations.
These regulations demonstrate for the first time that the federal government
recognizes the Hill-Burton community service obligation as a distinct substan-
tive obligation that the government is prepared to monitor and enforce in a
rigorous way. 17
required to comply with the assurances required to be made at the time such
assistance was received and the means by which such entity shall be required to
demonstrate compliance with such assurances.
An entity subject to the requirements prescribed pursuant to paragraph (6) respec-
ting compliance with assurances made in connection with receipt of financial
assistance shall submit periodically to the Secretary data and information which
reasonably supports the entity's compliance with such assurances. The Secretary
may not waive the requirement of the preceding sentence.
Id. HEW later cited these provisions as a mandate to issue new charity care regulations and to
federalize their enforcement in 1979. See notes 153-54 infra.
The 1974 legislation also authorized the withholding of payments to any recipients not
complying with these assurances. Public Health Service Act § 1612(b), as amended by Pub. L. No.
93-641, § 4, 88 Stat. 2263 (1974). In addition, it mandated a greater federal enforcement effort
for these assurances, set out a federal administrative procedure for adjudicating consumer com-
plaints of non-compliance with the charity care obligations, and established a private right of ac-
tion for complainants if action is not commenced by HEW within 60 days. Public Health Service
Act § 1612(c), as amended by Pub. L. No. 93-641, § 4, 88 Stat. 2264 (1974).
These provisions were renumbered, and modified in the 1979 legislation. See Public
Health Service Act § 1627, as amended by Pub. L. No. 96-79, § 202, 93 Stat. 634 (1979). The new
§ 1627, which incorporates the language of the preexisting § 1612(b) and (c) now reads:
Sec. 1627. The Secretary shall investigate and ascertain, on a periodic basis,
with respect to each entity which is receiving financial assistance under this title or
which has received financial assistance under title VI or this title, the extent of
compliance by such entity with the assurances required to be made at the time
such assistance was received. If the Secretary finds that such an entity has failed to
comply with any such assurance, the Secretary shall report such noncompliance to
the health systems agency for the health service area in which such entity is located
and the State health planning and development agency of the State in which the
entity is located and shall take any action authorized by law (including an action
for specific performance brought by the Attorney General upon request of the
Secretary) which will effect compliance by the entity with assurances. An action to
effectuate compliance with any such assuranqe may be brought by a person other
than the Secretary only if a complaint has been filed by such person with the
Secretary and the Secretary has dismissed such complaint or the Attorney General
has not brought a civil action for compliance with such assurance within six
months after the date on which the complaint was filed with the Secretary.
42 U.S.C. § 300s-6 (Supp. III 1979).
The 1979 health planning amendments also strengthened the administrative tools
available to enforce compliance with community service by providing that in making certificate of
need decisions, health planning agencies can consider the extent to which "proposed services will
be accessible to all residents of the area to be served by such services." See Public Health Service
Act § 1532(c)(6), as amended by Pub. L. No. 96-79, § 116(f)(6)(E), 93 Stat. 613 (1979), codified at
42 U.S.C. § 300n-1 (Supp. III 1979).
16 See text at notes 137-52 infra.
17 These regulations were not the first specifically to recognize the community service
[Vol. 23:577
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The principle underlying the requirement of community service as stated
in the new regulations is that a health facility:
. . . shall make the services provided in the facility . . . available to all
persons residing . . . in the facility's service area without discrimination
on the ground of race, color, national origin, creed, or any other ground
unrelated to an individual's need for the service or the availability of the
needed service in the facility .... "I
As defined by the regulations, the community service obligation is far more
than a proscription on discrimination in the usual sense of that term. 19 Under
the new regulations a hospital is required to accept virtually without exception
anyone who is able to pay for medical services. Thus, people who do not have a
physician on the facility's medical staff; people who "probably can pay" but
do not have cash, credit, or third party payment available; Medicaid and
Medicare recipients; and, at least by implication, the privately insured, wbuld
be assured access by the regulations.2 0 The regulations leave little doubt as to
the meaning and intent of the community service requirement since they in-
clude a series of illustrative examples of applications of the obligation. 21 These
examples indicate HEW's willingness to assert the community service obliga-
tion even in the face of time-honored admission practices.
22
Both the hospital industry and the medical profession have closed ranks in
opposition to the enforcement of the community service requirement, and the
American Hospital Association has brought suit to challenge the government's
authority to issue the 1979 regulations.2 3 If the protracted struggle over the
obligation. The significance of the new regulations derives from the fact that they clearly in-
dicated an intent, for the first time, to monitor and enforce compliance. See notes 146-58 infra.
The underlying substantive principles have been incorporated into the federal regulations at least
since 1964. See notes 133-36 infra.
18 42 C.F.R. 5 124.603(a)(1) (1980). See text at notes 158-70 infra for further discussion
of this principle.
19 The use of the term "discrimination" disguises the true meaning of these regulations
somewhat. Among other things, the new regulations employ an "effects" test for measuring
compliance. See 42 C.F.R. S 124.603(d) (1980). For a full discussion of this matter, see text at
notes 164-70 infra.
20 See note 174 infra.
21 See notes 173-80 infra.
22 42 C.F.R. § 124.603(d)(1)-(3) (1980), cited in full text at note 172 infra. The ex-
planatory material that accompanied the issuance of the regulations also clarified HEW's intent.
See note 157 infra.
23 The American Hospital Association (AHA) sought to enjoin enforcement of the 1979
regulations immediately following their enactment, arguing that the regulations exceeded
HEW's statutory authority, conflicted with the Medicare conditions of participation, and
violated its contractual rights. The district court denied plaintiff AHA a preliminary injunction,
holding that it had not shown irreparable harm, that it had not demonstrated a reasonable
likelihood of success, and that the balance of hardships favored denial of the injunction.
American Hosp. Ass'n v. Harris, 477 F. Supp. 665, 668-69 (N.D. Ill. 1979), aff'd, 625 F.2d
1328; 1331-32 (7th Cir. 1980). The court of appeals affirmed in a brief opinion, giving little in-
dication of the court's views on the merits. See 625 F.2d 1328, 1331-32 (7th Cir. 1980). Judge Pell
in a dissenting opinion, however, exhaustively reviewed the merits of the case and indicated he
was in agreement with many of the plaintiff's arguments. See id. at 1332-44. On remand, the
district court upheld the validity of the 1979 regulations. American Hosp. Ass'n v. Schweiker,
May 1982]
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Hill-Burton uncompensated service regulations is any indication of the contro-
versy that lies ahead, the pending community service litigation is only the first
of many judicial, administrative, and possibly, legislative confrontations be-
tween the hospital industry and other medical care providers, consumer
groups, and state and federal government officials. Even if the federal govern-
ment's authority to issue the 1979 community service regulations is upheld, it
is unlikely that any single judicial determination can definitively settle the
seemingly endless array ofjurisdictional, 24 procedural, 25 and substantive issues
that rigorous enforcement of community service will eventually raise. 2 If, as is
likely, future federal administrations revise the federal posture on the regula-
tions or their enforcement, a reshuffling of strategies and another round of
challenges by all affected parties will undoubtedly ensue. 2
7
Although the charity care obligations of Hill-Burton hospitals have been
repeatedly examined by judicial and administrative tribunals during the last
ten years, such review has tended to focus on the uncompensated service, not
the community service, obligation. 28 Even those courts which have purported
to interpret both obligations have generally viewed community service and un-
compensated service as deriving from parallel bases, ignoring or failing to ap-
preciate the distinct statutory basis and administrative history of the communi-
ty service obligation. 29 The legal literature concerning the Hill-Burton charity
No. 78C 2269, N.D. Ill., Jan. 8, 1982.
24 See notes 159 and 163 infra.
25 The enforcement procedures and methods for determining compliance have been on-
ly generally outlined in the 1979 regulations. Subsequent to the regulations, HEW (later HHS)
issued a series of draft policy directives to federal and state agencies and to affected institutions
outlining compliance and assessment procedures. Most of these directives have been codified into
a looseleaf manual available from regional HHS offices. PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE, DEPART-
MENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, COMPLIANCE STANDARDS MANUAL: UNCOMPEN-
SATED CARE AND COMMUNITY SERVICE OBLIGATIONS (first published in 1979) (also known as
"Provider's Guide").
26 See note 164 infra. Even if the regulations or enforcement policies are not changed
during the current administration other federal policy shifts could have considerable impact on
the meaning of the community service regulations. For example, should the Medicaid program
be restructured to represent something less than "reasonable cost" reimbursement, see note 178
infra, then the notion that a Medicaid recipient has the ability to pay might require modification.
27 As of this writing, federal administrative officials have announced their intention to
continue to enforce the charity care regulations. It is not clear, however, whether the 1979
regulations will be revised. See Washington Report on Medicine and Health, January 18, 1982 at 3.
28 This is not to say that there has not been some judicial examination of the commu-
nity service obligation. See cases cited at note 29 infra. But it is clear that the initial round of chari-
ty care litigation focused primarily on uncompensated service, see note 141 infra, and to the ex-
tent that derivative issues were pursued vigorously by the various proponents, it appears that the
uncompensated service obligation was the primary focus of all concerned. See, e.g., Corum v.
Beth Israel Medical Center, 373 F. Supp. 550 (S.D.N.Y. 1974). Obviously this is in part a reflec-
tion of the government's enforcement efforts. See text at notes 141-45 infa, summarizing the
various attempts to establish an "uncompensated service" enforcement program.
29 Only a few federal district courts have directly addressed community service in any
detail. See Cook v. Ochsner Found. Hosp., 61 F.R.D. 354, 356-58 (E.D. La. 1972); Perry V.
Greater Southeast Wash. Community Hosp. Found., No. 721-71, 2-11 (D. D.C. June 28, 1972)
(see explanation at note 146 infra). See also American Hosp. Ass'n v. Harris, 625 F.2d 1328,
[Vol. 23:577
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care obligations suffers from the same shortcoming. Though there has been
substantial debate over the meaning and history of the Hill-Burton charity care
obligations, the debate has been almost myopically focused on uncompensated
service.
30
This article focuses squarely on the community service provision and the
regulations promulgated thereunder. The analysis traces the statutory and
regulatory history of the community service obligation and examines the scope
of the discretion that has been delegated to federal and state agencies to define
and enforce this obligation. The discussion begins with a brief history of the
original Hill-Burton program and the several amendments and modifications
of the program over the last several decades. Next, the legislative history of the
community service obligation is examined in an effort to determine the scope of
authority created by Congress in establishing the community service obliga-
tion. Specifically, this section addresses the questions of whether Congress in-
tended the community service provision to impose an affirmative obligation
upon funded facilities, and whether the requirement is one of general availabil-
ity of medical services or simply a prohibition on racial discrimination. An ex-
amination of the regulatory history of the community service obligation
follows, including a discussion of the 1979 regulations themselves. This section
also addresses the questions of whether the 1979 regulations exceed the scope of
authority as defined by previous regulations, and whether enforcement of the
1979 regulations has a retroactive effect which results in an unconstitutional
impairment of contract and property rights. It will be submitted that the pre-
sent community service regulations are indeed authorized by Congress and
that retroactive application of the regulations, at least back to 1964, neither ex-
ceeds the scope of authority as set out previously by statute or regulation, nor
unconstitutionally impairs contract or property rights.
I. BACKGROUND OF THE HILL-BURTON PROGRAM
The Hospital Survey and Construction Act of 1946, 3 the initial
authorization for the Hill-Burton program, was a significant departure from
1342-43 (7th Cir. 1980) (Pell, J., concurring and dissenting).
30 See Rose, Federal Regulation of Services to the Poor Under the Hill-Burton Act. Realities and
Pitfalls, 70 Nw. U.L. REv. 168 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Rose]; Rosenblatt, Health Care Rqform
andAdministrative Law: A StructuralApproach, 88 YALE L.J. 243, 265-86 (1978) [hereinafter cited as
Rosenblatt]; Note, Due Process for Hill-Burton Assisted Facilities, 32 VAND. L. REv. 1469 (1979)
[hereinafter cited as Vanderbilt Note]; Note, The Hill-Burton Act, 1946-1980: Asynchrony in the
Delivery of Health Care to the Poor, 39 MD. L. REV. 316 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Maryland Note].
These commentators generally have analyzed the statutory bases for the charity care
obligations as if uncompensated service and community service had a single legislative history.
They have also addressed the problem as if it were primarily a matter of inferring congressional
intent in 1946. As this article will demonstrate, the proper inquiry should view community serv-
ice as a related but distinct obligation, and the legislative analysis should involve at least two in-
quiries, one focusing on the 1946 legislation and the other on the 1964 legislation. See text at
notes 56-129 infra.
31 Pub. L. No. 79-725, 60 Stat. 1040 (1946).
May 1982]
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previous federal policy and clearly represented the first major federal invest-
ment in mainstream medical care.32 In the three decades that followed, it was
one of the principal vehicles through which the federal government became ac-
tively involved in the development and distribution of health care resources.
While mild in comparison to some of the state and federal health financing and
regulatory programs which would follow in ensuing decades, the Hill-Burton
program laid the groundwork for many of these later efforts and initiated a new
and active role for both federal and state government in health care delivery."3
The original 1946 legislation established a complicated administrative
scheme under which federal financial assistance was provided to state govern-
ments34 to survey the need for health facility services and to develop a state
plan for the construction of hospitals and related facilities. 3" Public and non-
profit applicants that conformed to the federal and state requirements were
32 Prior to Hill-Burton, the federal government had maintained a limited role in the
delivery of medical care, chiefly through programs of direct services to federal dependents, e.g.,
the merchant marine, Indians, and military service personnel and their dependents. In addition,
the federal government had traditionally carried out a variety of federal public health and disease
prevention programs. For a good history of these activities, see Chapman & Talmadge, Historical
and Political Background of Federal Health Care Legislation, 35 L. & CONTEMP. PROB. 334 (1970). See
also Wing & Silton, ConstitutionalAuthorityfor Extending Federal Control Over the Delivery of Health Care,
57 N.C.L. REV. 1423, 1440 n.74 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Wing & Silton].
Nor did Hill-Burton mark the first time the federal government had subsidized health
facility construction. See programs described in Feshback, What's Inside the Black Box: Allocative
Politics in the Hill-Burton Program, 9 INT. J. HEALTH SERVICES 313, 317 (1979). See also COMMIS-
SION ON HOSPrrAL CARE, HOSPITAL CARE IN THE UNITED STATES 531 (1947). The
significance of the Hill-Burton program was its enormous cost relative to the cost of previous pro-
grams and its initiation of direct federal involvement in the delivery of medical care to the public
at large. For a discussion of the political implications of this sudden shift in federal policy, see
notes 63-64 infra.
33 For an overview of the Hill-Burton program and its role in the emergence of federal
and state health care financing and regulatory efforts, see Wing & Craige, supra note 6, at 1187;
see also A. SOMERS, HOSPITAL REGULAION: THE DILEMMA OF PUBLIC POLICY 132-51 (1969)
[hereinafter cited as SOMERS].
34 See generally Public Health Service Act §§ 612, 623, as amended by Pub. L. No. 79-725,
§ 2, 60 Stat. 1041 (1946).
The amount of federal funds for direct grants and, later, loans alloted to each state was
determined by a complicated formula based on each state's population, financial need (according
to per capita income), and the need for facilities. As the program was reauthorized and amended,
this formula was revised in several minor ways. For example, in 1970 a "floor" was placed under
each state's alloted share. Public Health Service Act § 602(a), as amended by Pub. L. No. 91-296, §
103, 84 Stat. 338 (1970). But throughout the program each state's share was determined primar-
ily on the basis of population, relative income, and need. For current codification, see 42 U.S.C.
§ 291b (1976). For an analysis of this allocation formula and its impact on the program's results,
see Lawrence, Clark, Field & Koontz, The Impact of Hill-Burton: An Analysis of Hospital Bed and
Physician Distribution in the United States, 1950-70, 18 MEDICAL CARE 532, 541-44 (1980).
35The original legislation earmarked Hill-Burton funding for hospitals and public
health centers. It allowed the funding of projects for other health facilities, but only when
operated in connection with a hospital. See Public Health Service Act §§ 622, 631, as amended by
Pub. L. No. 79-725, § 2, 60 Stat. 1041 (1946). Subsequent amendments allowed funding of other
categories of facilities. See notes 42, 49 and 50 infra.
[Vol. 23:577
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eligible for federal construction grants.3 6 In addition to the federal planning re-
quirements, participating states had to establish programs to maintain the
quality and safety of funded projects 37 and meet a variety of other federal re-
quirements in the administration of their survey and planning activities.38
Similarly, funded projects had to meet relatively extensive federal re-
quirements relating to standards of construction, operation, maintenance and
financial viability, as well as conform to the priorities established by the state
plan.
3 9
Although the basic administrative structure remained the same throughout
the history of the program, the original authorizing legislation was amended
frequently by Congress, adding new categories of funding recipients, 40 sup-
plementing the grant program with authorization for loans, loan guarantees,
and loan interest subsidies, and reflecting a changing - and, apparently, ever
growing - list of congressional priorities.41
In 1954, for example, the program was expanded by authorizing Hill-
Burton grants to various categories of health facilities not included in the
original legislation, such as nursing homes, rehabilitation facilities, and other
6 Hill-Burton grants did not pay the full cost of approved projects. The original legisla-
tion established a program of direct grants, limited to 33 Y3 % of the cost of the project. Public
Health Service Act § 625(b), as amended by Pub. L. No. 79-725, 5 2, 60 Stat. 1041 (1946). In 1949,
the federal share was increased to no more than 66% % or no less than 33/3 %. Pub. L. No.
81-380, § 3, 63 Stat. 899 (1949). This share remained essentially unchanged thereafter.
However, the 1970 amendments authorized states to pay 90% of certain "high priority" proj-
ects. Pub. L. No. 91-296, § 113(b)(4), 84 Stat. 341 (1970). For current codification, see 42
U.S.C. §§ 2910(b)(2), 2910(b)(4) (1978). Note also that subsequent amendments to the Hill-
Burton program allowed recipients to receive both a grant and a loan. See note 43 infra.
31 States were not specifically required to establish licensing programs for health
facilities, but were required to establish licensing programs for health facilities, to "provide
minimum standards . . . for the maintenance and operation of hospitals which receive Federal
aid. . .. " See Public Health Service Act §§ 623(a)(7), 623(d), as amended by Pub. L. No. 79-725,
§ 2, 60 Stat. 1041 (1946). For current codification, see 42 U.S.C. § 291d(a)(7) (1978). Under this
authority, federal regulations were issued interpreting this provision that included 32 pages of
detailed standards for construction and equipment for funded health facilities. These regulations
were, in effect, de facto federal licensing standards. See 42 C.F.R. § 53, Appendix A (1949). The
result was that many states established licensing programs for all hospitals and other health
facilities as a result of the original Hill-Burton legislation. See SOMERS, supra note 33, at 118-32.
38 Public Health Service Act §§ 612, 622, 623, as amended by Pub. L. No. 79-725, § 2, 60
Stat. 1041 (1946). For current codification, see 42 U.S.C. § 291d (1978). For example, states
were required to establish merit systems for employees in the administration of their planning
and survey activities. 42 C.F.R. § 53.158 (1949 ed., Supp. I).
39 See Public Health Service Act §§ 622, 625, as amended by Pub. L. No. 79-725, § 2, 60
Stat. 1041 (1946). For current codification, see 42 U.S.C. § 291d(a)(5)-(7) (1978).
40 See notes 42, 49 and 50 infra.
41 In addition to the supplemental financing mechanisms added later to the Hill-Burton
program, see note 43 infra, and the various shifts in the programs priorities, see notes 45-50 infra,
funding for a variety of related activities was frequently amended into the authorization for the
Hill-Burton program. See, e.g., the various research and demonstration grants authorized in
1949, Pub. L. No. 81-380, § 5, 63 Stat. 900, or those added in 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-395, § 4, 75
Stat. 825.
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long-term care facilities. 42 In 1958, amendments allowed states to make loans
as well as grants to health facilities out of their allotted funding.
43
The Hospital and Medical Facilities Amendments of 196444 added several
substantive changes to the explicit and underlying objectives of the program,
45
42 The 1954 legislation supplemented the hospital construction program by establishing
a separate funding program for diagnostic or treatment centers, chronic disease hospitals,
rehabilitation facilities, and nursing homes. Public Health Service Act §5 651-54, as amended by
Pub. L. No. 83-482, § 2, 68 Stat. 461 (1954). These separate programs were later consolidated in
the recodification of the Hill-Burton legislation in 1964. See note 45 infra.
The 1970 amendments, described in notes 49-50 infra, also expanded the types of proj-
ects that could be funded, including projects for new equipment not associated with construction
projects, and projects for emergency and related services, and added a "laundry list" of special
priorities, e.g., projects which have special significance for the treatment of alcoholism.
Thus, in the span of three decades, the Hill-Burton program evolved from a program of
rather narrow statutory focus, funding the construction of new hospitals, to a vehicle for pro-
viding federal financial assistance for a variety of capital and other expenditures by health care
providers.
43 Amendments to the Hill-Burton program in 1958 authorized states to give loans for
the construction of health facilities out of their allotments, but this was apparently intended to ap-
ply only in the case of religious-affiliated institutions that had conscientious objections to receiv-
ing grants from the federal government. Public Health Service Act §§ 661-664, as amended by Pub.
L. No. 85-589, 72 Stat. 489 (1958). See S. REP. No. 1846, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1958
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 3255, 3255.
In 1961, this loan authorization was extended without reference to religious institutions
in the legislative history, and the authorization was increased from $30 million to $50 million a
year. Pub. L. No. 87-395, §§ 6, 8, 75 Stat. 826, 827 (1961). In lieu of a separate authorization for
loans, the 1964 amendments allowed states to make loans to applicant facilities out of their
allotments for grants, under the same terms and conditions as they make grants. Public Health
Service Act § 610, as amended by Pub. L. No. 88-443, § 3, 78 Stat. 457 (1964). For current
codification, see 42 U.S.C. § 291j (1978).
The 1970 amendments created two separate loan programs. The first program author-
ized: (1) loan guarantees and interest subsidies for private non-profit applicants and; (2) loan
guarantees without interest subsidies for public applicants. This program was for either construc-
tion or modernization of projects of any type allowed under the legislation. See generally Public
Health Services Act §§ 621-626, as amended by Pub. L. No. 91-296, § 201, 84 Stat. 344 (1970).
The second loan program created by the 1970 amendments authorized a direct loan pro-
gram for public applicants for construction or modernization projects of any kind permitted
under the legislation. Seegenerally Public Health Service Act §§ 631-638, as amended by Pub. L. No.
91-296, § 301, 84 Stat. 350 (1970).
Among other essential differences between these programs and earlier authorizations for
loans, applicants under the 1970 loan programs could receive Hill-Burton grants and also receive
loan guarantees and subsidies for the remaining cost of the project. As noted above, the loan
guarantees and direct loan programs established in 1970 significantly expanded the program;
$2.4 billion in loan guarantees and $750 million in direct loans were authorized, more than
double the 1970 authorization for direct Hill-Burton grants. For current codification of these
loans programs, see 42 U.S.C. § 291j-1 (1978).
44 Pub. L. No. 88-443, 78 Stat. 447 (1964). These amendments reorganized and
recodified the statutory authorization of the Hill-Burton program, and made many substantive
changes as well. See notes 45-46 infra.
45 In addition to emphasizing the funding of modernization projects and other major
policy changes, see note 46 infra, the 1964 amendments gave priority to "facilities serving densely
populated areas," adding to the list of program priorities that had previously included rural areas
with relative small financial resources. In 1970, however, Congress de-emphasized services to
rural areas, making it a priority at the option of the state, and gave highest priority to moderniza-
tion projects in urban poverty areas. Pub. L. No. 91-296, § 110, 84 Stat. 339 (1970).
The 1964 amendments also authorized for the first time federal funding of areawide
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among them a requirement that a substantial portion of the hospital appropria-
tions be spent for modernization projects - a significant shift in the program's
policy. 4 6 The 1964 amendments also greatly expanded authorization for
loans .47
In 1970, Congress again revised and expanded the loan program, creating
additional programs of direct loans to public applicants as well as a program of
loan guarantees and interest subsidies for private non-profit applicants to sup-
plement the grant program. 48 The 1970 amendments also, for the first time,
health planning agencies, albeit on a modest scale; $2.5 million for 1965; $5 million for each of
the next four years. Pub. L. No. 88-443, § 2, 78 Stat. 447 (1964). However, this authorization
was superceded by the health planning program authorized under the Partnership for Health
Amendments of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-174, 81 Stat. 533 (1967), and was never fully im-
plemented.
46 See Public Health Service Act §§ 605, 606, as amended by Pub. L. No. 88-443, § 3, 78
Stat. 454 (1964), now codified as 42 U.S.C. § 291(f) (1976).
While the original legislation theoretically allowed for the funding of both new construc-
tion and modernization, that legislation specifically required that priority be given to new con-
struction projects in rural areas and in areas with few financial resources. The initial regulations
also implied an administrative preference for "additional capacity" over "replacement." See 42
C.F.R. § 53.43 (1949). As a consequence, most of the funding went to projects for new construc-
tion and, generally, new hospital construction. By 1964 the Hill-Burton program had funded
7,306 new construction projects, assisting in the construction of 311,000 inpatient hospital beds
in 2,011 health facilities at a cost of $6.7 billion. See S. REP. No. 1274, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 2,
reprinted in 1964 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWs 2800, 2800-01.
However, the 1964 amendments and all subsequent authorizations specifically ear-
marked a large- portion of the program funds for modernization and, in effect, the 1964 legisla-
tion shifted the emphasis-of the program from new facility construction to modernization. In
terms of dollar amounts, the 1964 legislation authorized a total of $840 million to be appropriated
over the following five years for hospitals and public health centers. Of this amount, $680 million
was designated for construction and $160 million was designated for modernization projects.
However, up to $530 million of the grant funds could be transferred to modernization projects, at
the option of each state. States could also transfer up to $70 million from modernization to new
construction. Pub. L. No. 88-443, § 602, 78 Stat. 448 (1964).
In comparison, the 1964 legislation also authorized a total of $350 million for the con-
struction of long-term care facilities, $100 million for the construction of diagnostic or treatment
centers, and a total of $50 million for the construction of rehabilitation centers. See S. REP. No.
1274, 88th Cong. 2d Sess. 1-2, reprinted in 1964 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD NEWS 2800, 2800-01.
By 1969, only 25 % of the program funds were being spent for new construction projects;
apparently the states had opted to shift the bulk of their Hill-Burton allotments to modernization.
See S. REP. No. 657, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 9, reprinted in 1970 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
3332.
When the program was reauthorized in 1970, the need for the modernization of existing
hospital and long-term care beds was described as the "nation's gravest health facility problem"
and there was estimated to be a need for modernizing or replacing 455,130 acute and long-term
beds at a cost of $1 billion dollars, i.e., an investment nearly equal to the entire expenditures that
had been assisted under the grant program prior to 1970. Id. at 6, reprinted in 1970 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS at 3338.
The 1970 authorizations reflected these findings and the program's growing focus on
modernization financing: $920 million was authorized for construction of hospitals and public
health centers, $515 million for modernization, and $155 million for construction of other types
of health facilities, with slight changes in the options for shifting funds from one category to
another. See Public Health Service Act § 601, as amended by Pub. L. No. 91-296, §§ 101-102, 84
Stat. 337 (1970).
47 See note 43 supra.
48 See note 30 supra for a description of these programs.
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authorized Hill-Burton assistance for freestanding clinics and ambulatory care
facilities, 49 and for the construction or modernization of emergency rooms and
related services .
5
In 1974 appropriations for the Hill-Burton program were discontinued
and the program was effectively replaced by the enactment of the National
Health Planning and Resources Development Act. 51 The new legislation
essentially reorganized several existing federal activities, including the Hill-
Burton program, into a single health planning program. 52 The new program
authorized federal funding for the construction of health facilities in a manner
similar to the Hill-Burton program, but with a significantly different emphasis
and with the authority carried out in conjunction with other related resource
planning activities by newly created state health planning programs.5 3 While
Congress continued to authorize federal assistance for the construction of
health facilities under the new Act, it has not yet appropriated funding for this
part of the program. Given the political realities of the 1980's, 54 it appears
unlikely that the kind of federal support for health facility construction or
modernization that had been available under Hill-Burton will be forthcoming
in the foreseeable future.
55
From its beginning, then, the Hill-Burton Act represented the efforts of
Congress to use funding incentives to influence the construction and
49 Public Health Service Act § 621(a), as amended by Medical Facilities Construction and
Modernization Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-296, § 201, 84 Stat. 344 (1970).
50 1970 amendments authorized $20 million for three years for grants for the construction
or modernization of emergency rooms, communication networks, or transportation systems. Public
Health Service Act § 601, as amended by Pub. L. No. 91-296, 84 Stat. 350 (1970).
51 Pub. L. No. 93-641, 88 Stat. 2225 (1974), codfiedat 42 U.S.C. § 300k et seq. (Supp. III
1979).
52 For an explanation of this legislation and its background, see Wing & Craige, supra
note 6, at 1190-92.
53 The new legislation authorizes resources development grants and loans, 42 U.S.C.
§ 3000-300t-14 (Supp. III 1979) but the statute outlines a slightly different set of funding
priorities, see §§ 300q(a)(1), 300r(a) and (b), than those of the original Hill-Burton program. Fur-
thermore, the new scheme consolidates the resource development funding with other regulatory
and planning functions performed by newly-created health systems agencies and state health
planning programs. See 42 U.S.C. § 300s-1(b)(1)(A) (Supp. III 1979).
5' Estimates vary, but there is general agreement that an excess of hospital capacity ex-
ists in this country, see Wing & Craige, supra note 6, at 1177-78, an excess created at least in part
by the financial incentives of the Hill-Burton program. Thus, there is unlikely to be much
political support for the continuation of federal financial assistance for health facility construc-
tion. Hospitals and other health facilities have generally turned to other sources for their capital
funds. See Hilferty, Capital Financing For Hospitals: The New York Experience, 57 N.C. L. REV. 1383,
1384-85 (1979).
Ironically, recent congressiohal amendments to the 1974 planning legislation allow for
federal financial assistance to convert or discontinue use of health facility assets, a program which
might be labeled a "reverse Hin-Burton program." See National Health Planning and Resources
Development Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-79, 93 Stat. 634, codi)fied at 42 U.S.C. § 300k et seq.
(Supp. III 1979).
55 For a relevant discussion of the shift in federal health policy which has resulted in this
reluctance to provide further federal funding of health facility construction, see Wing & Silton,
supra note 32, at 1428-35.
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maintenance of the nation's health facilities in accordance with congressional
objectives. As mentioned above, one of those objectives is the requirement of
community service imposed upon funded facilities. To illustrate the substance
of that requirement, it is necessary to examine the legislative history of the pro-
gram.
II. ANALYSIS OF THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
In analyzing the legislative history of the statutory language authorizing
Hill-Burton community service obligation, two questions of fundamental im-
portance must be addressed: (1) whether Congress intended to impose an
affirmative obligation on recipient facilities to provide community service, and
(2) whether Congress intended the community service obligation to require
general availability of services or only to prohibit racial discrimination. Both of
these questions require an analysis of the text and legislative history of the
original 1946 enactment, as well as the subsequent amendments to the original
authorizing legislation.
A. Did Congress Intend to Authorize Regulations Affirmatively
Requiring Recipient Facilities to Provide "Charity Care" Services?
Previous commentary on the legislative and administrative history of
charity care - commentary which has focused primarily on the meaning of the
uncompensated service obligation 56 - has stimulated a lively debate over the
nature and extent of the government's authority to enforce charity care obliga-
tions.7 Among other things, critics of rigorous enforcement of charity care in
general and of the 1979 regulations in particular have argued that the obliga-
tions as originally enacted were not meant to be substantive conditions affirm-
atively requiring recipient facilities to provide services. 58 Furthermore, relying
56 See note 30 supra.
57 See articles cited at note 30 supra.
58 See Vanderbilt Note, supra note 30, at 1475-80; see also Maryland Note, supra note 30,
at 318-25; American Hosp. Ass'n v. Harris, supra note 23.
The most extreme position is that taken by the Vanderbilt Note. The Note's analysis of
the legislative history urges that the objective of the legislation - and not the means chosen to
achieve it - was to finance only facilities, not services. Therefore, it is argued, Congress could
not have intended the charity care provision to be interpreted to authorize regulations requiring
recipient facilities to either provide uncompensated services or community service. See Vanderbilt
Note, supra note 30, at 1475-76. See also Maryland Note, supra note 30, at 320-21.
This "facilities-not-services" argument is an unconvincing one. Even a cursory
reference to the declaration of purposes, see note 85 infra, or the statutory provisions outlining re-
quirements for the state plan or allocation of funds, see notes 34-39 supra, indicates that the objec-
tive of Congress was not to fund facilities per se. Both Notes also seem to ignore the regulatory
conditions that accompanied state and recipient facility funding. See note 39 supra. Why would
there be priorities, allocation formulas, and a requirement of determining need, if Congress was
not concerned with services and the populations that needed them?
Further, the "facilities-not-services" argument in the Vanderbilt Note is based almost
entirely on remarks made during the 1945 Senate hearings, remarks which preceded the inclu-
sion of the "charity care" language in the statute. See note 73 infra. Even assuming the Senate
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on the observation that Congress' original intent in establishing the Hill-
Burton program was only to finance hospital construction, not hospital services,
some critics have reasoned that the language of the charity care provision could
not have been intended to impose substantive obligations on recipient facilities
to provide either uncompensated service or community service. As one com-
mentator phrased it, charity care was meant only to be a "spirited promise." 5 9
On its face, the text of the original statute authorizing the charity care
regulations seems to refute the contention that Congress intended merely to
make a "spirited promise." The charity care legislation, containing the
language from which both the community service and the uncompensated serv-
ice obligations are derived, provided, in its original form, that:
Within six months after the enactment of this title, the Surgeon
General, with the approval of the Federal Hospital Council and the Ad-
ministrator, shall by general regulation prescribe -
(f) That the State plan shall provide for adequate hospital facilities for
the people residing in a State, without discrimination on account of race,
creed, or color, and shall provide for adequate hospital facilities for persons
unable to pay therefor. Such regulation may require that before approval of
any application for a hospital or addition to a hospital is recommended by a
State agency, assurance shall be received by the State from the applicant
that (1) such hospital or addition to a hospital will be made available to all persons
residing in the territorial area of the application, without discrimination on account of
race, creed, or color, but an exception shall be made in cases where separate
hospital facilities are provided for separate population groups, if the plan
makes equitable provision on the basis of need for facilities and services of
like quality for each such group; and (2) there will be made available in each such
hospital or addition to a hospital a reasonable volume of hospital services to persons
unable to pay thereor, but an exception shall be made if such a requirement is
not feasible from a financial standpoint.6 0
hearing transcript reflected the interpretation that the Notes claim, reliance on these remarks as
the basis for determining the congressional intent in an amendment subsequently added is ques-
tionable. See notes 75-76 infra.
Similarly, it is difficult to understand the confidence with which the Maryland Note
claims that "a reading of the transcripts shows" that the Congress did not intend by the charity
care provision to impose substantive obligations on Hill-Burton recipients. See Maryland Note,
supra note 30, at 321. Given the dearth of congressional commentary on the meaning of the
statutory language, an overall reading does not provide much guidance as to the congressional
intent with regard to charity care, and, in particular, community service.
59 See Vanderbilt Note, supra note 30, at 1479.
60 Public Health Service Act, § 622(), as amended by Pub. L. No. 79-725, § 2, 60 Stat.
1041 (1946) (emphasis added).
Note that an exception to the uncompensated care obligation was allowed in the original
legislation if implementation was "not feasible from a financial standpoint." Public Health Serv-
ice Act § 622(f)(2), as amended by Pub. L. No. 79-725, 60 Stat. 1041 (1946). This same exception is
contained in all subsequent versions of the relevant provisions, even after the revisions in 1964.
See note 45 supra. See 42 U.S.C. § 291c(e) (1976). Presumably, facilities could be allowed to
waive the "community service" obligation if its implementation were not "feasible from a finan-
cial standpoint." In practice, however, no grantee has ever been permitted to waive the obliga-
tion. See Rose, supra note 30, at 170.
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The plain meaning of the statutory language, then, foresees regulations
requiring funded facilities to be "available to all persons" residing in the com-
munity (community service), and to provide a "reasonable volume of hospital
services for those unable to pay therefor" (uncompensated services). In short,
the legislation authorizes substantive conditions to be imposed upon recipient
facilities.
Furthermore if the original legislation and its history are examined close-
ly, and with exclusive concern for the meaning of the "available to all"
language which creates the community service obligation, it is clear that critics
have vastly oversimplified the statutory scheme and that Congress' intent with
regard to community service cannot be so easily inferred. Indeed, despite the
inclinations of various critics to find clarity where there is none, 61 the specific
meaning of the original "available to all" language may well defy definitive in-
terpretation, however closely the legislative history is read. 62 Yet it is difficult to
read that history and conclude that Congress did not intend to impose an af-
firmative community service condition on recipient facilities, however it is
specifically defined.
In analyzing the legislative history of the charity care provision, it must be
noted that the political dimensions of the legislative process which led to the
enactment of the original Hill-Burton program are also not easily character-
ized. Clearly the legislation was a result of the genuine - and apparently
universal - concern in Congress that there was a shortage of hospital services
in many parts of the country during the Depression and World War 11.63 But
61 See note 58 supra.
62 See text at notes 82-89 infra.
63 Throughout the public health and legal literature, commentators have uniformly and
repeatedly described the Hill-Burton program as a response to the shortage and maldistribution
of hospitals and other health facilities recognized by Congress following the Depression and
World War II. Indeed, a straightforward reading of the legislative history of the original Hill-
Burton proposal would certainly indicate that there was general - virtually unanimous - agree-
ment within Congress and in public opinion as to the pressing need for more hospitals.
Both in the congressional committee reports, S. REP. No. 674, 79th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1945); H.R. REP. No. 2519, 79th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1946 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 1558, and in the floor debates, see, e.g., 91 CONG. REO. 11,713-17 (1945) (remarks of Sen.
Hill); 92 CONG. REC. 10,211 (1945) (remarks of Rep. Whittington), frequent and unchallenged
claims were made that many areas of the country had insufficient hospital services and that some
areas had no hospital services at all. The committee reports even went so far as to estimate the
number of Americans without access to hospital care, see, e.g., S. REP. No. 674 at 41, and to
estimate that if the proposed federal program spent $75 million a year for five years that only
20% of the hospitals that would be needed would be built. Id. at 6.
As the proposal was considered by Congress, no one contested the need for additional
hospital services and virtually no one disputed the need for remedial legislation. Despite the
range of ideological differences that prevailed during the period, see note 64 infra, liberals and
conservatives from both parties rallied support for the legislation.
There is no indication of any organized opposition to the proposition that there was a
nationwide shortage of hospitals or to the call for remedial legislation. Though some provisions of
the bill caused a series of lively skirmishes in committee and on the floor of both houses, they in-
volved largely peripheral issues. There was some opposition from political conservatives who cor-
rectly anticipated that the Hill-Burton program would be just the beginning of even broader
federal involvement in health care, e.g., 92 CONG. REc. 10,210 (1946) (remarks of Rep.
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Hill-Burton was also the result of the interaction of a variety of diverse political
forces which, for somewhat different purposes, converged in support of a single
proposal. This observation must qualify any attempt to infer congressional in-
tent from the legislation's political history. 64 On the other hand, while descrip-
tions of the program's politics and their implication can vary, the legislative
Jensen), but these objections were repeatedly answered by the assertion that there was a shortage
of hospitals created by World War II and the Depression, and neither private initiative nor local
government could underwrite the necessary capital investment. See, e.g., 92 CONG. REc. 10,209
(1946) (remarks of Rep. McCormack), 92 CONG. REc. 10,213 (1946) (remarks of Rep. Savage).
Remarkably unanimous support for the concept of a health facility construction program
also came from the private sector. Throughout the legislative process the bill received the active
support of the American Hospital Association, but see note 64 infra, the American Public Health
Association, the American Medical Association (which had traditionally opposed any form of
government involvement in medical care, see 92 CONG. REc. 10,208 (1946) (remarks of Mr.
Bulwinkle)), and a host of other lobbyist and political groups. For a list of organizational spon-
sors, -see H.R. REP. No. 2519 at 3, reprinted in 1946 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1560.
64 A program to provide federal financial assistance for hospital construction was part
of the legislative strategy of political forces from both ends of the political spectrum during the
1940's. Although once the Hill-Burton legislation had been submitted it moved through Con-
gress with a speed that suggested a firmly-built political consensus, it is also clear that the pro-
posal was the end-product of a long and hard-fought political struggle. In fact, the Hill-Burton
program and the ease with which it was enacted may be best described in terms which emphasize
that a health facility construction program was the single common ground among many
ideological and political perspectives.
Several health care reform programs had been advocated by liberal New Dealers
throughout the Roosevelt administration, including a number of proposals for a national health
insurance program. See generally Falk, Proposals For National Health Insurance in the USA: Origins and
Evolution, and Some Perceptionsfor the Future, 55 MILBANK MEMORIAL FUND Q. 161, 167-71 (1977).
Throughout the Depression and World War II years, Senator Wagner of New York sponsored a
series of health care reform proposals and jointly sponsored the Dingell-Murray-Wagner bill,
variations of which were first proposed as early as 1939, see, e.g., S.1620, 76th Cong., 1st Sess.,
reprinted in 84 CONG. REG. 10,983 (1939), which would have established a nationalized health in-
surance program, funding for the development of prepaid group practices, expansion of federal
research and public health programs, and a program of financial assistance for the construction
of health facilities.
While opposed to these broader reform measures, some political conservatives, eager to
develop an alternative to President Roosevelt's New Deal politics and, later, the proposals of the
Truman administration, attempted to forge a series of alternative health initiatives which called
for programs which minimized federal involvement and relied more heavily on the private sector
for delivery and financing of health care services. As early as 1939, Senator Taft from Ohio, a
moderate Republican, proposed in a speech to the Cameron Medical Association the adoption of
a federal hospital construction program - very much like the eventual 1946 legislation - argu-
ing that it would be both good policy and a preferred alternative to the national health insurance
proposals and other reform schemes proposed by Wagner and other liberals. See 84 CONG. REC.
A3156 (1939).
The interplay of conservative and liberal ambitions nearly resulted in the establishment
of a health facility construction program in 1940, when a program very similar to the eventual
Hill-Burton proposal was passed by the Senate but died in the House. The bill was sponsored by
Senators George and Wagner and actively supported by Senator Taft, with some objections, and
other Senate Republicans. See Hearings on S.3230 beore the Senate Subcommittee of the Committee on
Education and Labor, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. 8-12 (1940). S.3230 was apparently the result of a pro-
posal made earlier that year by President Roosevelt, see H.R. Doc. No. 604, 76th Cong., 2d
Sess. 1-3 (1940). Note also that this same section included a community service provision.
Curiously, this same "community service" language was not included in the 1945 Hill-Burton
proposal, but was amended to that proposal during committee deliberations, possibly at the in-
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history of the original proposal, 65 is surprisingly short and straightforward,
particularly with regard to the charity care provision and the portion of that
provision which established the statutory basis for the community service
obligation.
sistence of Senator Taft. See note 75 infra.
A similar proposal was also spawned by hearings held in 1944 before the Senate Sub-
committee on Wartime Health and Education, chaired by Senator Pepper, later one of the prin-
cipal actors in the consideration of the Hill-Burton proposal, which also documented a need for
additional hospital services in this country and for remedial federal legislation. Investigation of the
Educational and Physical Fitness of the Civilian Population as Related to National Defense: Hearings on S. 74
before the Subcommittee on Wartime Health and Education of the Committee on Education and Labor, 78th
Cong., 2d Sess. 1873-74 (1944).
Apparently, by the end of World War II, the political debate in Congress centered prin-
cipally on the scope and form of health reform legislation, not whether legislation in any form was
appropriate. During this same period, representatives of the hospital industry, realizing their in-
ability to secure private or local government sources to finance capital expansion, were also ac-
tively pursuing federal health legislation to assist health facility construction. In 1942 the
American Hospital Association (AHA) sponsored the establishment of a private commission to
study the future of the American hospital industry; after two years of study, the commission
issued a report purporting to document a shortage of hospital facilities and urging a national
survey and planned effort. COMMISSION ON HOSPITAL CARE, HOSPITAL CARE IN THE UNITED
STATES (1947). Although the final report was not published until after the Hill-Burton program
was enacted, the AHA-backed commission apparently worked closely with congressional
representatives, see id. at 3-7, and it has been reported by several authorities that the commission
and the AHA were influential in writing the first draft of the original Hill-Burton proposal. See
SOMERS, supra note 33, at 133-34; Feshback, supra note 32, at 316-18. See note 70 infra. The com-
mission and AHA representatives were also actively involved in the public debate over this pro-
gram and some commentators have credited them with a substantial role in the behind the scenes
maneuvering. See Feshback, supra note 32, at 319. For a good history and description of the com-
position of the Commission on Hospital Care, see id. at 317-19.
From a broader perspective, some commentators have also argued that the Hill-Burton
proposal was only one part of a broader social and economic strategy and essentially a com-
promise between organized labor, business interests, and the government in an attempt to
stabilize the economy and avoid post-war labor unrest. See Feshback, supra note 32, at 314-16. See
also E.R. BROWN, ROCKEFELLER MEDICINE MEN 198-212 (1979).
65 As some commentators have argued, the original Hill-Burton program may have
been principally a rejection of liberal reform proposals, such as the Dingell-Murray-Wagner bill,
see note 64 supra, and a victory for those who favored a more conservation approach to the
hospital shortage problem. See Vanderbilt Note, supra note 30, at 1478. See also Maryland Note,
supra note 30, at 320.
Conversely, Rosenblatt, supra note 30, at 266-68, describes the enactment of Hill-Burton
more as a compromise victory for moderate conservatives who made several significant conces-
sions to secure liberal support. Rose, supra note 30, at 172, also characterizes the legislative
history in these terms.
This latter characterization appears to be more accurate. During the time that the Hill-
Burton proposal was working its way through Congress, it is clear that liberals still hoped to
secure a more sweeping bill. There were several attempts to attach broader reforms to the Hill-
Burton proposal by amendment. See, e.g., 91 CONG. REC. 11,799 (1946). Some Senate liberals
made clear that their support for S. 191 came only from a preference for broader but unattainable
reforms and that they considered Hill-Burton only a first step in the right direction. See, e.g., S.
REP. No. 674, supra note 63, at 21 (minority view of Senator Murray).
When the Senate-passed bill was before the House, the committee deliberations con-
tinually involved a comparison of S. 191 to several other health facility construction program pro-
posals, some of which involved maintenance funding, and to the pending National Health Act of
1945, H.B. 4730, the latest version of the Dingell-Murray-Wagner bill. See, e.g., Hospital Con-
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Following the introduction of the original proposal by Senator Hill, 6 six
days of public hearings were held before the Senate Committee on Education
and Labor in February and March of 1945. 67 During the public hearings, a
special subcommittee composed of Senators Hill, Taft, Ellender, Tunnell, and
LaFollette held several weeks of closed and undocumented "study sessions"
during which Hill's original bill was in large part rewritten.68 This revised bill
was approved by the committee, reported back to the Senate floor, and, after a
relatively short debate, passed by a virtually unanimous vote in December,
1945.69
In the House, the Senate bill followed a similar course. The House Com-
mittee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce held five days of hearings and
reported the Senate bill favorably back to the House floor, but with several ap-
parently controversial amendments concerning the appropriations authorized
and the method for allocating funds to each state.70 With these amendments
and following a lively but short debate, the bill was passed by the House.7
While the two houses were of like mind with regard to most provisions of
the bill, they locked horns over the House amendments. A joint conference
negotiated a compromise, but the House rejected the first conference report.
7 2
A second report, essentially calling for the Senate to accede to the House
struction Act: Hearings Before A Subcommittee of the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 79th
Cong., 2d Sess. 163-64 (1946) [hereinafter cited as 1946 House Hearings].
It is quite obvious that it required a coalition of both liberals and conservatives to spon-
sor the Hill-Burton program and shepherd the legislation through Congress. The rapidity of the
proposal's enactment can only be explained by the near consensus which that coalition
represented.
66 S.191, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. (1945), submitted 91 CONG. REc. 158 (1945).
67 S.191 was referred to the Senate Committee on Education and Labor which held
public hearings in February and March, 1945. Hearings on S.191 Bfore the Senate Committee on
Education and Labor, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. (1945) [hereinafter cited as 1945 Senate Hearings]. Con-
currently, a subcommittee held closed "study sessions" during which S.191 was redrafted prior
to final action by the whole committee. S. REP. NO. 674, supra note 63, at 2.
68 Id. at 1.
69 On the Senate floor, the amended bill received little opposition, see note 63 supra, and
after a relatively short debate and little visible controversy, S.191 was passed on December 11,
1945. 91 CONG. REc. 11,800 (1945).
70 In the House, S.191 was referred to the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign
Commerce, 91 CONG. REC. 11,930 (1945), which also held extensive hearings, 1946 House Hear-
ings, supra note 65, and issued a report closely paralleling the Senate committee report. The bill
was reported favorably back to the House floor, 92 CONG. REC. 10,204 (1946), but with several
apparently controversial amendments: The House committee (1) recommended reducing the
federal reimbursement for state planning program costs from 50%, as in S.191, to 33%, (2)
reduced the $5,000,000 appropriation for state planning to $3,000,000, and (3) reduced the
amount of federal grant from a range of 75 % - 33 /3 % of the construction project costs to a flat
33 Ys %. See H.R. REP. NO. 2519, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 2-3, reprinted in 1946 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 1558-59.
7, As in the Senate, after a relatively short debate the amended S.191 was passed with
little dissent. 92 CONG. REC. 10,213 (1946).
72 After the Senate refused to accept the amendments, a joint conference committee
was appointed, id. at 10,241, 10,316, but the first conference report was rejected by the House
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amendments, was eventually accepted, 73 and the bill was signed into law by
President Truman in August of 1946.
7
4
Thus, in the span of one session Congress enacted an unprecedented
spending program and drastically revised federal health policy. Understand-
ably, the bill provoked a series of lively skirmishes on both floors and in com-
mittee. But opposition to the bill was surprisingly short-lived and generally
focused on peripheral issues such as the powers of the federal hospital council
or the method and amount of appropriations to each state. Congress, it ap-
pears, was primed for prompt action. Weighty issues of federal-state relations,
trade-offs for other social programs, the over-all impact on the federal budget,
and other policy considerations were dispatched with surprising speed and vir-
tual unanimity.
As a consequence, the relatively minor issue of the scope and nature of the
conditions that could be imposed on recipient facilities received little attention
and infrequent mention throughout the short legislative deliberations. In fact,
the entire legislative history of the community service obligation involves a
single thread of legislative events to which little coloration can be added. The
charity care provision including the "available to all" language was added as
one of the revisions made during the closed "study sessions" that coincided
with the Senate hearings. It appeared for the first time with many other
amendments but without elaboration in the Senate committee report. 75 Once
added to the rewritten bill, the provision remained unchanged through both
and resubmitted. Id. at 10,484.
73 Id. at 10,619, 10,667.
74 Id. at 10,741.
75 See S. REP. NO. 674, supra note 63, at 9. Senate 191 in its original form mentioned
neither obligation, but only established the general goal of "furnishing adequate service to all of
the people" in the declaration of purposes. S.191, 79th Cong., 1st Sess., § 601 (1945), as cited in
Rosenblatt, supra note 30, at 266 n.78. More specific standards were to be left to the discretion of
the Federal Hospital Council. Id. at 266 n.79. The language of the charity care obligations ap-
peared for the first time in the amended S.191 that emerged from the closed executive sessions
held by the Senate study committee, during the hearing on S.191 in November, 1945. See note
67 supra.
Rose, supra note 30, at 167, credits Senator Taft with authorship of the charity care pro-
vision during the closed executive session, drawing attention to his earlier remarks during the
public hearings indicating that a "free service" requirement might be an appropriate amend-
ment. Id. at 168. While his specific authorship of the "community service" language has never
been suggested, he did play a major role in the legislation and in the redrafting of the proposal
during the closed study session. See S. REP. No. 674, supra note 63, at 2.
The chronology of events and the fact that the bill was rewritten in subcommittee are
critical aspects of the legislative history. Some critics have attempted to infer congressional intent
from the statements of witnesses and legislators made at the public hearings prior to the redrafting
and prior to the inclusion of the charity care amendments. For example, the Vanderbilt Note,
supra note 30, at 1474-75, goes into great detail in analyzing the committee deliberations during
the public hearing in an effort to determine congressional intent of the subsequent amendment.
Oddly, the Note ignores any of the subsequent legislative deliberations, including parallel hear-
ings in the House. At the least, a legislative history should only begin with a reference to the 1945
Senate hearings, but focus on inferring the intent of the subsequent amendments and the
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houses and several rounds of committee hearings. 76 As with many other provi-
sions of the bill, it received little mention or commentary in either the Senate or
House deliberations. 
7 7
To be sure, as several critics have stressed, Congress, by enacting the
1946 legislation or by amending into it the charity care language, did not in-
tend to provide funding for rendered services or to require that all indigents be
provided with care. 78 Congress had rejected broader reform proposals such as
national health insurance 79 and, during consideration of the bill, had rejected
deliberations that followed. See note 58 supra.
76 There is no general discussion of the meaning of the "charity care" or the "available
to all" language in the 1946 House Hearings. There are references to the obligation, however, in
statements by several of the witnesses that indicate at least these witnesses considered "available
to all" a substantive obligation. See, e.g., statements of Physician's Forum, 1946 House Hearings,
supra note 70, at 146-47; Congress of Industrial Organizations, id. at 162; National Farmer's
Union, id. at 177; American Osteopathic Association, id. at 183; American Optometric Associa-
tion, id. at 202; Independent Citizens' Committee, id. at 237. All of these statements called for an
amendment to the "available to all" language to prohibit discrimination against physicians seek-
ing staff privileges at Hill-Burton hospitals. This position was also voiced in the Senate floor
debate, see note 71 supra. Cf. statement by American Public Health Association, id. at 142 (claim
that the bill needed to be amended to prohibit discrimination against either patients or
physicians). There is also a statement by the representative of the Alpha Kappa Alpha ap-
plauding the inclusion of language specifically prohibiting racial discrimination. Id. at 186.
77 The committee reports from both houses make similarly laconic references to the
charity care obligations. The House report virtually reiterates the statute:
The State plans would be required by regulations under paragraph (0 to provide
for adequate facilities without discrimination on the basis of race, creed, or color,
and for adequate facilities for those unable to pay. The regulation may require an
applicant for an individual project to give assurance that the hospital facility con-
structed pursuant to such project will serve all persons residing in the territorial area of the
applicant. The latter requirement, however, must permit of an exception where
separate hospital facilities are provided for separate population groups, but only if
the State plan makes equitable provision, on the basis of need, for facilities and
services of like quality for each group. The regulations under this paragraph may
also require that an applicant give assurance to the State that it will furnish a
reasonable volume of services to persons unable to pay therefor, unless such a re-
quirement is not financially feasible.
H.R. REP. No. 2519, supra note 62, at 17, reprinted in 1946 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1564
(emphasis added). The Senate Report used similar language:
(f) The regulations would require that the Senate plan provide for adequate
hospital facilities for the people of the State, without discrimination on account of
race, creed, or color, and for adequate hospital facilities for persons unable to pay
therefor. Regulations may require that an applicant for an individual hospital con-
struction project give assurance to the State that it will serve all persons residing in
the territorial area of the applicant, but if the regulations do so prescribe, they
must make an exception where separate hospital facilities are provided for separate
population groups, if the State construction plan makes equitable provision on the
basis of need for facilities and services of like quality for each such group. The
regulations may also require that an applicant give assurance to the State that it
will furnish a reasonable volume of hospital services to persons unable to pay
therefor, unless the hospital is unable to undertake such a commitment.
S. REP. No. 674, supra note 63, at 9.
78 See note 58 supra. See also Maryland Note, supra note 29, at 320-21. Cf. Rosenblatt,
supra note 30, at 268 ("Congress intended to accomplish a substantial but partial solution to the
problem of providing hospital care to lower-income patients.").
79 See S. REP. No. 674, supra note 63, at 17 (dissenting view of Senator Murray).
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attempts to include additional funding for maintenance of services.8 0
Nonetheless, to conclude, as some critics have, that Congress could not have
intended to condition receipt of funds on the provision of either uncompensated
service or, in particular, community service, is simply a leap of logic not
justified by any reading of the legislative history, however sparse it may be, 8' or
by any construction of the statutory language, or the events that led to it.
Similarly, to suggest that the original Hill-Burton program was intended
to fund facilities, but not services, may be an adequate shorthand description of
the principal means Congress chose to achieve its objectives, but hardly
describes the objectives themselves, or, for that matter, the structure of the
legislation. In enacting Hill-Burton, Congress was clearly intending to assist
health facility construction for the purpose of assuring the availability of
hospital services. 82 Congress was just as clearly trying to do so under certain
conditions and within certain established and developed priorities. 83 The provi-
sion of community service is explicitly required by the "available to' all"
statutory language. It is also reflected in both the structure84 and the stated
purposes of the program. 85 To the extent that the issue of "available to all"
80 See note 65 supra.
8 Neither of the floor debates addressed directly the meaning of "available to all." The
only relevant remark is the brief discussion by Senator Murray on the lack of a provision protec-
ting access of physicians to medical staff. 91 CONG. REC. 11,719 (1945). See a similar statement
by Senator Langer. 91 CONG. REc. 11,799 (1945). While it is hard to infer congressional intent
from a single remark, Senator Murray's statement at least indicates that he viewed "available to
all" as both a general prohibition on discrimination and a substantive, enforceable obligation.
Charity care was not mentioned at all on the House floor.
82 See description of the original statutory scheme in text at notes 34-39 supra.
83 See notes 37-39 supra.
84 See generally text at notes 34-39 supra. Among other things, a requirement that a
funded facility would be "available to all" can be found in the method proscribed for determin-
ing "need" and the formula for alloting the funds to various states. The original legislation
defined "need" for purposes of determining the priority of projects in terms of beds per thousand
in the population. See Public Health Service Act, § 622(a), as amended by Pub. L. No. 79-725, 5 2,
60 Stat. 1041 (1946). See also § 622(c). This specific bed-population formula was later criticized as
inflexible and was revised, but the definition of need still remained a function of need of the
population. For current codification, see 42 U.S.C. 5 291(c) (1976).
Similarly, the original § 622(d) required states to determine the "priority of projects
based on the relative need of different areas lacking adequate hospital facilities, giving special
consideration to hospitals serving rural communities and areas with relatively small financial
resources." Public Health Service Act, § 622(d), as amended by Pub. L. No. 79-725, § 2, 60 Stat.
1041 (1946). This language was amended in 1964, see note 44 supra, but the recodification retains
similar language. 42 U.S.C. § 291c(a)(1) (1978).
The provisions of the Hill-Burton legislation relating to appropriations and their alloca-
tion among the various states were amended many times, see notes 34 and 36 supra, but the basis
for the allocation formula remained the same: funds were allocated on the basis of the states'
population and per capita income. See 42 U.S.C. § 291(b) (1974). For the original provision, see
Public Health Service Act § 613, as amended by Pub. L. No. 79-725, 5 2, 60 Stat. 1041 (1946).
Taken together these provisions at the least confirm that Congress' intent was to provide
needed services, not simply to fund facilities. These provisions also make clear Congress'
primary concern focused on the needs of the population in the area of the facilities funded, and
therefore carry at least a strong inference that Congress expected funded facilities to be generally
available to that population.
85 The declaration of purposes in the original legislation included reference to the
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was discussed during the 1945-46 legislative process, it appears to have been
assumed that recipient facilities would be generally available without discrimi-
nation - that they would accept anyone who had the ability to pay.86 In fact,
"available to all" principle incorporated in the charity care provision. As stated in the original
legislation:
The purpose of this title is to assist the several states -
(a) to inventory their existing hospitals. . . to survey the need for construction of
hospitals, and to develop programs for construction of such public and other non-
profit hospitals as well, in conjunction with existing facilities, afford the necessary
physical facilities for furnishing adequate hospital, clinic, and similar services to all
thdrpeople; and (b) to construct other nonprofit hospitals in accordance with such
programs.
Public Health Service Act § 601, as amnded by Pub. L. No. 79-725, § 2, 60 Stat. 1041 (1946) (em-
phasis added).
This statement of purposes was later amended and expanded several times to incor-
porate various changes in the program, but the relevant language has remained the same:
The purpose of this subchapter is -
(a) to assist the several States in the carrying out of their programs for the con-
struction and modernization of such public and other nonprofit community
hospitals and other medical facilities as may be necessary, in conjunction with ex-
isting facilities, to furnish adequate hospital, clinic, or similar services to all their
people; (b) to stimulate the development of new or improved types of physical
facilities for medical, diagnostic, preventive, treatment, or rehabilitative service;
and (c) to promote research, experiment, and demonstrations relating to the effec-
tive development and utilization of hospital, clinic, or similar services, facilities,
and resources, and to promote the coordination of such research, experiments,
and demonstrations and the useful application of their results.
42 U.S.C. § 291 (1976) (emphasis added).
86 Many of the participants in the Senate committee discussions appeared to assume that
recipient facilities would be available to all people who can pay, the principle underlying com-
munity service. See, e.g., remarks of Dr. Donald C. Smelzer, President of the American Hospital
Association (one of the principal sponsors of the legislation) 1945 Senate Hearings, supra note 67, at
10-35. But see note 65 supra. Dr. Smelzer argued against broadening the bill to include free service
for the poor, but for a bill to provide "[an] integrated plan for the distribution of those personal
services in such a fashion that they may be available to all people." See 1945 Senate Hearings, supra
note 67, at 10-11. See also statements of Dr. Smelzer, id. at 30-35; the Surgeon General, id. at 90;
the U.S. Department of Labor, id. at 130; and a representative of the American Medical Associa-
tion, id. at 149-50.
In discussing the obligations of recipient facilities under the proposed program, Dr.
Fredrick Mott, Chief Medical Officer, Farm Security Administration, Department of
Agriculture, said: ". . . there would certainly be an obligation to meet the needs of all the peo-
ple of that service area, for which the hospital was designed, which, of course would include
many indigent and medically indigent." Id. at 190.
While Dr. Mott's opinion is hardly dispositive of the issue, the discussion immediately
following the remark between some of the principal sponsors of both the bill and the subsequent
charity care amendments is crucial:
Senator Pepper: . . . [I]n determining the burden which the hospital would be
expected to carry, they might not be able to get Federal aid unless they agreed to
take a fixed number of indigent patients. ...
Senator Taft: That is what I mean. I imagine every hospital of a general nature
would be lucky if they did not have 20 percent of indigent patients. ...
Senator Ellender: If people in all localities were able to pay for hospitalization
there would be no need for this bill. It seems to me that our primary purpose
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without the notion that a recipient health facility was to provide certain s*ervices
to the public, the program becomes almost ludicrous: a major spending pro-
gram to finance health facility construction solely to benefit the facility, but not
the people in its community.
87
Whatever the specific meaning of the community service obligation, an
issue discussed in more detail below, it appears beyond question that Congress
in 1946 intended to require recipient facilities to be "available to all,' '88 just as
they were to comply with a number of other conditions. Indeed, it did so under
circumstances that strongly suggest that such a provision was one of the revi-
sions of the original bill necessary to consolidate congressional support for the
enactment of the program. 89 The "facilities not services" argument is based on
an overly simplistic view of the Hill-Burton program and Congress' intent and
is, at best, good advocacy, but hardly sound scholarship.
It seems reasonable to conclude, therefore, that Congress, in enacting the
Hill-Burton program, intended to authorize regulations which affirmatively re-
quire recipient facilities to provide charity care services. The express language
of the statute supports such a conclusion, and the legislative history is void of
any indication to the contrary. Indeed, the single dominant theme pervading
the legislative history - a concern for establishing adequate medical facilities
throughout the country - indicates Congress was deeply concerned that fund-
ing be conditioned only on compliance with the program's objectives, in-
cluding those reflected in the charity care obligations.
B. Does "Community Service" Require General Availability
or Merely Prohibit Racial Discrimination?
The "available to all" language of the original statute authorizing the
community service regulations can be interpreted in two ways. 90 Interpreted in
should be to devise means to take care of those who cannot take care of themselves.
My reason for supporting a bill providing for federal aid to build hospitals is to
make it easy for the community in which a hospital may be built to give aid to the
indigent ...
Senator Taft: [T]hese facilities must be made available to the people ...
Id. at 190-91. See also id. at 193-95.
As in the Senate testimony, virtually every witness at the 1946 House hearings appeared
to assume that the purpose of the program was to make services generally available to the public.
See, e.g., 1946 House Hearings, supra note 70, at 51-52 (testimony of American Hospital Associa-
tion); Catholic Hospital Association, id. at 64; American Protestant Hospital Association, id. at
77; and American Public Health Association, id. at 141.
87 See Rosenblatt, supra note 30, at 272-73.
88 The case law has consistently stated that an enforceable "available to all" condition
was established in 1946. See, e.g., Lugo v. Simon, 426 F. Supp. 28, 36 (N.D. Ohio 1976); Cook
v. Ochsner Found. Hosp., 319 F. Supp. at 606 (E.D. La. 1970).
89 See text and notes at notes 63-75 supra.
90 The relevant language is: "(1) such hospital or addition to a hospital will be made
available to all persons residing in the territorial area of the applicant, without discrimination on
account of race, creed or color. . . ." Public Health Service Act § 622(f), as amended by Pub. L.
No. 79-725, § 2, 60 Stat. 1041 (1946).
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its most narrow sense, the original statute, as at least one court has held, 91 pro-
hibits only discrimination based on race, color, or national origin, except under
"separate but equal" conditions.9 2 Under a broader interpretation, the
"available to all" language is both a prohibition on discrimination on the basis
of race, color, or national origin, and a requirement that facilities be generally
available to the community as a whole.
Reference to the original declaration of purposes" and the structure of the
bill, 94 supports the broader interpretation, or, at least, leaves the statute open
to that interpretation. While a review of the sparse legislative history has little
interpretive value, it nevertheless does allow some support for the proposition
that Congress intended "available to all" to be interpreted in the broader
sense, not just as a prohibition on racial discrimination.
95
Congress no doubt intended to condition Hill-Burton funding at least on a
prohibition of racial discrimination, if not on the broader mandate. Unfor-
tunately, in exercising that authority, federal administrative officials did little
to clarify its scope. 96 Following the 1946 legislation, there was no further
specification of the administrative interpretation of "available to all" until
1964, 97 nor was there a history of the provision's enforcement 8 until the
1970's, when HEW was forced to make serious enforcement efforts: 99 Conse-
quently, whether the authority created by the 1946 legislation was interpreted
by the officials carrying out the program to authorize community service
91 See Perry v. Greater Southeast Wash. Community Hosp. Foundation, No. 725-71 at
5 (D.D.C. June 28, 1972). See note 146 infra for further discussion of this case. See also American
Hosp. Ass'n v. Harris, 625 F.2d 1328, 1336 (7th Cir. 1980) (Pell, J., dissenting).
Oddly, the most severe critics of charity care enforcement have not really addressed this
issue. It is not clear how the author of the Maryland Note interprets the "available to all"
language in the 1964 legislation. At one point it is observed with apparent approval that the com-
munity service obligation was perceived to mean that a facility would not discriminate in allow-
ing access by all persons in its service area. See Maryland Note, supra note 30, at 325. Later, that
same author refers to the Peny decision as determining that community service was a negative
prohibition against discrimination, not an affirmative mandate. Id. at 330. See also Vanderbilt
Note, supra 30, at 1479.
92 See note 162 infra.
93 See full text at note 85 supra.
94 See discussion of program at notes 56-62 supra.
9' Again, while the legislative history gives little from which a definitive conclusion can
be drawn, the implications are strong that many members of Congress understood that Hill-
Burton facilities would be available to all in the broader sense. See notes 75-77 and 86 supra.
96 See note 131 infra for the text of the original regulations.
97 See note 131 infra for the text of the 1947 regulations. HEW officials have on at least
two occasions, however, taken the position that the original statute authorized the broader com-
munity service obligation. See 1978 proposed federal regulations, 43 Fed. Reg. 49,955 (1979) and
see note 132 infra.
98 While neither HEW nor its predecessor agencies had a charity care enforcement pro-
gram, there was at least one occasion prior to 1964 when community service obligation was en-
forced and, on that occasion, "available to all" was given the broader interpretation. See note
132 infra.
99 See note 147 infra.
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regulations of the scope and nature of those promulgated in 1979, or only
regulations ° ° prohibiting racial discrimination, is open to question.10 1
Ironically, the first meaningful interpretation of the community service
obligation came from a federal court decision invalidating a portion of the
statutory language which created the charity care obligations. Relying on the
language which effectively created a "separate but equal" exception to the pro-
hibition on racial discrimination, the Public Health Service (and later HEW),
during the first two decades of the program, had given Hill-Burton grants to a
number of facilities despite their open and official policies of racial discrimina-
tion.1 0 2 In 1963, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in Simkins v. Moses
H. Cone Memorial Hospital, ruled that the portions of the federal statute and
related regulations permitting this practice were unconstitutional. 1
03
As a result of this decision, when Congress recodified and expanded the
Hill-Burton program in 1964,104 the provision establishing the charity care
obligations was amended, modifying the "available to all" language and omit-
ting the "separate but equal" exception. As a result of this amendment, the
statute now provides that:
. . . the Surgeon General . . . shall by general regulations prescribe -
• . . That the State plan shall provide for adequate hospitals, and other
facilities for which aid under this part is available, for all persons residing in
the State, and adequate hospitals (and such other facilities) to furnish need-
ed services for persons unable to pay therefor. Such regulations may also
require that before approval of an application for a project is recommended
by a State agency to the Surgeon General for approval under this part,
assurance shall be received by the State from the applicant that (1) thefacility
or portion thereof to be constructed or modernized will be made available to all persons
residing in the territorial area of the applicant; and (2) there will be made
available in the facility or portion thereof to be constructed or modernized a
reasonable volume of services to persons unable to pay therefor, but an ex-
ception shall be made if such a requirement is not feasible from a financial
viewpoint.•
05
On its face, the portion of the amended provision creating the community serv-
100 See text at notes 165-69 infra.
1l See Rosenblatt, supra note 30, at 279-80.
102 The relevant language is: "[B]ut an exception shall be made in cases where separate
hospital facilities are provided for separate population groups, if the plan makes equitable provi-
sion on the basis of need for facilities and services of like quality for each such group .... "
Public Health Service Act 5 622(0, as amended by Pub. L. No. 79-725, 5 2, 60 Stat. 1041 (1946)
(revised in 1964, see notes 105-06 infra). See Wing, Title VI and Health Facilities: Forms without
Substance, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 137, 144 (1978).
103 323 F.2d 959, 970 (4th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 938 (1964). The decision
gives no interpretation of the portion of the statute relevant to this article.
104 The specific references to race, color, or national origin were omitted in the
recodification of the statute in 1964. See text at notes 91-100 supra.
105 Public Health Service Act 5 603(e), as amended by Pub. L. No. 88-443, § 3, 78 Stat.
451 (1964), codified at 42 U.S.C. § 291c(e) (1976).
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ice obligation leaves little doubt as to Congress' intent to establish a general
obligation for the facilities to be "available to all," and not merely to ban racial
discrimination, since all references to racial discrimination are omitted. It is
not clear, however, whether this amended language is a restatement of the pre-
existing community service obligation, modified to conform to the Simkins deci-
sion, or the creation of what is essentially a new obligation to be applied pro-
spectively to facilities funded after 1964.106 Regardless of how the specific in-
tent of Congress in 1946 is interpreted, there can be no doubt that when Con-
gress revised and recodified the authorizing legislation for Hill-Burton in
196407 it intended the program to impose a general community service
requirement on recipient facilities, a requirement broader than a simple ban on
racial discrimination. This proposition can best be supported by examining the
specific legislative events leading to the enactment of the 1964 amendment.
The original 1964 bill, sponsored by Congressman Harris and Senator
Hill, purported to carry out the proposal of the Johnson administration for
various policy shifts in the existing Hill-Burton health facility construction pro-
gram.105 During deliberations before the House Committee on Interstate and
Foreign Commerce, however, the committee differed with the administration
on several matters relating to the appropriations and the priorities established
by the Hill-Harris proposal and eventually rewrote the bill accordingly.
10 9
Among other things, the committee disagreed with the administration on the
nature of the amendment to the "available to all" language required by the
106 HEW has consistently taken the position that the community service obligation was
created by the 1946 legislation, and the subsequent revision to the statute amended the language
but did not alter the underlying obligation established in 1946. See, e.g., 43 Fed. Reg. 49,954
(1978).
107 For a description of the 1964 amendments, see notes 44-47 supra.
108 On February 10, 1964, President Johnson delivered to Congress his message on
health services, outlining his proposals on health insurance for the aged (later to be enacted as
Medicare), an extension of the Hill-Burton program, federal financing for health personnel
education, and various other health services and public health programs. H.R. Doc. No. 224,
88th Cong., 2d Sess. (1964), reprinted in 110 CONG. REC. 2695 (1964).
Congressman Harris later described H.R. 10041, the Hill-Harris proposal for a
reauthorization of the Hill-Burton program, as an attempt to carry out one portion ofJohnson's
proposal. Extension and Revision of Hill-Burton Hospital Construction Program: Hearings on H.R. 10041
before the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1964)
[hereinafter cited as 1964 House Hearings]. But see note 109 infra.
109 From the outset of the initial congressional hearings, it became clear that significant
differences existed between the administration and at least some members of Congress. The
hearings were marked by long debates betwen HEW officials and other representatives of the ex-
ecutive branch and members of the committee on such matters as appropriations, the amount to
be spent on modernization, and priorities for spending. See notes 44-46 supra. For a summary of
these differences, see 1964 House Hearings, supra note 108, at 94-95.
The Committee report, H.R. REP. NO. 1340, 88th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1964
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWs 2800, substituted by amendment an entirely rewritten Hill-
Harris bill, preserving the main elements of the original H.R. 10041, but adding a number of
substantive changes, see id. at 2, 1964 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 2801. Among the
changes made was a revision of the amendment to the "community service" language proposed
in the administration's bill. See notes 110-11 infra.
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Simkins ruling. The administration's bill had proposed that the new statutory
language omit only the reference to the "separate but equal" exception that
had been declared unconstitutional in Simkins.110 The committee, over the
110 In an important dialogue between the Secretary of HEW, Mr. Celebrezze, and the
committee, Mr. Celebrezze voiced his and the administration's views on the language preferred
by committee:
H.R. 10041 proposes to eliminate the "separate but equal" provisions of the Hill-
Burton legislation and to require that the State plan shall provide for adequate
facilities "for all persons residing in the State." It would authorize a requirement
that the "facility or portion thereof to be constructed or modernized will be made
available to all persons residing in the territorial area of the applicant." We should
much prefer the language of the administration proposal, that is, "without
discrimination on account of race, creed, or color," because we feel it more clearly
expresses the national policy on this matter.
Following last week's action by the Supreme Court, I directed that the following
additional steps be taken:
(1) That we make permanent the earlier decision to approve no new ap-
plications under the "separate but equal" provision of the law;
(2) That we require a nondiscrimination assurance in admittance from
those pending projects previously approved on a "separate but equal" basis;
(3) That we seek from all pending projects an assurance that there will be
no discrimination on the basis of race, or color in granting staff privileges; and
(4) That the application forms to be used hereafter be amended to require
of all applicants whose application has not been finally approved a nondiscrimina-
tion assurance covering staff privileges and admissions, and that all portions and
services of the facilities be made available without discrimination on account of
race, creed, or color.
Finally, Mr. Chairman, consideration is being given to calling a meeting of the
leaders in organized medicine, in the hospital and other appropriate health fields,
with the view toward implementing a program for voluntary compliance with
these policies. I would hope that such a voluntary program would encompass not
only Hill-Burton hospital facilities but all hospitals in the United States.
Our urgent responsibility is to assure adequate health care to all Americans. I
would think that none would deny that consideration of race or color has no place
with regard to the ailing body or the healing hand. I believe we have an opportuni-
ty to demonstrate a constructive and positive approach to assuring equal oppor-
tunity in this important area of health care that will have wide significance in these
changing times.
Mr. Chairman, we urge your favorable consideration of legislation improving and
extending the Hill-Burton program, and, in particular, that H.R. 10041 be
amended to include the administration's proposals in regard to new construction,
modernization, and nondiscrimination in the use of Hill-Burton facilities. I shall
be pleased to answer any question submitted by the committee.
The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Secretary, in view of the facts of life which you have just
recognized in your statement, and which have been called to the attention of all of
the American people by the decision of the Supreme Court in its refusal to accept
the case of North Carolina, this business of discrimination is completely moot,
isn't it?
Secretary CELEBREZZE. In the laying down of the Simkins decision, together
with other restrictions, I don't know whether it is a moot question. I think we had
to take some action also in assurance, but I think that basically we have no alter-
native but to follow the decision of the Simkins case here.
The CHAIRMAN. In other words, the matter has been settled.
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repeated objection of the administration, preferred to remove both the excep-
tion and all reference to race, color, or national origin.111 The language adopted
Secretary CELEBREZZE. The matter has been settled by the courts.
The CHAIRMAN. The law is the law.
Secretary CELEBREZZE. That is right.
The CHAIRMAN. And you had taken action even before the Supreme Court
denied certiorari.
Secretary CELEBREZZE. Yes. I had to take action.
The CHAIRMAN. Why should we get into a fuss and argument? Even though I
don't agree with the Supreme Court decision and I am not in accord, as you know,
with some of the matters regarding the civil rights proposal, nevertheless, that hap-
pens to be the law today, isn't it?
Secretary CELEBREZZE. That is right. I merely called it to the committee's at-
tention so that the committee was fully informed of what action the administration
has taken.
The CHAIRMAN. However, there is no particular reason for us to get into any
dogfight because of controversy over that question here now, is there?
Secretary CELEBREZZE. No. If it is the law of the land it becomes the law and
there isn't much we can do about it. The courts have spoken on it.
The CHAIRMAN. Therefore, it seems to me the language in the bill with
reference to this particular item should satisfy the situation.
Secretary CELEBREZZE. Except that we feel that the words should be kept in the
bill, "without regard to race, creed, or color."
The CHAIRMAN. I know you feel that way, but it doesn't add anything, does it,
except your feelings.
Secretary CELEBREZZE. No; I think it makes it more explicit. Did you say my
feelings?
The CHAIRMAN. I said it didn't add anything except your feelings. You said
you feel that it should be included. I said it doesn't add anything except your feel-
ings.
Secretary CELEBREZZE. When I use the word "feeling" I am using it in a
broad sense as a lawyer uses it.
The CHAIRMAN. I use it in that sense, too. The point I am trying to suggest for
the record here is that I see no reason, in this sensitive, touchy area, when it has
been decided for us, to take a lot of time arguing about a moot question,
Secretary CELEBREZZE. I am fearful, Mr. Chairman, that in the administra-
tion of the Harris bill which omits the words, "without regard to race, creed, or
color" that we are getting into an area, a much, much broader area, as to the
definition of what is meant: Do you mean that the hospitals then should include
professional people which they do not include now?
I am talking about osteopaths, or the other professional group. Is that what you
mean? When you button discrimination down to the three causes, then we are
guided by those three causes - you can't discriminate because of race, creed, or
color.
The way it is in the present bill I think it would be rather difficult to draw the line
as to what is meant by discrimination and I think that is the reason for defining it
and limiting it to the three categories.
1964 House Hearings, supra note 108, at 52-54.
It is not clear from this cat-and-mouse dialogue whether Secretary Celebrezze favored
the broad or narrow interpretation of "available to all," but clearly he understood the difference
between the original and the amended language. And, whatever his intent during this dialogue,
within weeks after the enactment of the 1964 legislation, his agency published regulations inter-
preting "available to all" in terms leaving no doubt as to the agency's broad reading of that
language. 29 Fed. Reg. 18,447 (1964).
"I' The discussion in the committee hearings is sparse but clearly indicative of the com-
mittee's intent. In addition to Secretary Celebrezze, other witnesses representing the executive
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by the committee, as critics repeatedly pointed out, imposed a general non-
discrimination requirement on recipient facilities. The bill reported back to the
floor included the language: "That the state plan shall provide for adequate
hospitals and other facilities . . . for all persons in the state . . . assurance
shall be received . . . that (1) the facility or portion thereof to be constructed
or modernized will be made available to all persons residing in the territorial
area of the applicant . . 2
In this form, the bill was passed by the House without further discussion
or amendment.1 1 3 Because authorization for the program had expired, the bill
was heard in one day before a Senate committee and reported back to the
Senate floor with no amendments and virtually no substantive discussion.1 1 4
branch continually pointed out that the committee's "available to all" language would be much
more than a prohibition on discrimination on the basis of race, creed, or color unless the ad-
ministration's original language replaced the broader language added by the committee. See, e.g.,
testimony of representative of Bureau of the Budget, 1964 House Hearings, supra note 108, at 20;
testimony of the Department ofJustice, id. at 23; testimony of the Comptroller General, id. at 24.
American Medical Association representatives even went so far as to suggest that the
proposed "community service" language would make all recipients de facto public hospitals. Id.
at 203-05. See also the follow-up letter from same witness in the appendix to the hearing record.
112 H.R. 10041, § 3, as amended by H.R. REP. No. 1340, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. (1964).
There was only a brief discussion of this language in the House report:
[E]xisting law provides, in relevant part, that facilities must be made available to
all persons residing in the territorial area served by the applicant, but 'an excep-
tion shall be made in cases where separate hospital facilities are provided for
separate populations.'
The language quoted above was held unconstitutional by the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in the case of Simkins et al. v. Moses H. Cone
Memorial Hospital, 323 F.2d 959 (1963) and the Supreme Court denied certiorari in
the case. For this reason the bill does not contain the language held unconstitu-
tional or any other language on the subject.
Id. at 10. The only other reference to "available to all" in the body of the report, merely
reiterates the statutory language verbatim. Id. at 16.
Included in the appendix to the committee report are several letters received by the com-
mittee from various government agencies including the Attorney General, the Comptroller
General, and the Legislative Reference Service. These letters reiterate the testimony which the
agencies gave at the House hearings. Each of these letters points out that the language of the
House bill as reported by the House is broader than a simple prohibition on racial discrimination. See
id. at 33-35.
113 H.R. 10041 passed the House after one day of debate, May 25, 1964. 110 CONG.
REc. 11,803 (1964). In the brief debate, the "available to all" provision is mentioned only once,
in comments by Rep. Anderson affirming his interest in amending the statute to conform to the
Simkins decision. 110 CONG. REc. 11,797-798 (1964).
114 In the Senate the bill was referred to the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare on
May 26, 1964. 110 CONG. REc. 12,087 (1964). While the bill was being considered, Senator Hill
submitted an alternative bill, S.2531, which was nearly identical to the original administration
bill rejected by the House. See Hospitals and Medical Facilities: Hearings on H.R. 10041, S.2531 and
S.894 before the Subcommittee on Health of the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, 88th Cong.,
2d Sess. (1964) [hereinafter cited as 1964 Senate Hearings].
The Senate subcommittee appeared to prefer S.2531 to H.R. 10041, see, e.g., 1964 Senate
Hearings, at 132-44 (presentation on behalf of the Department of Health, Education and
Welfare), but since the Hill-Burton authorization was to expire on June 30, 1964, H.R. 10041
was favorably, but reluctantly, reported back to the Senate floor to avoid a funding lapse in the
program, see id. at 171, and without amendment. S. REP. No. 1274, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 1,
reprinted in 1964 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2800. Parenthetically, even though it purported
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There was no discussion of the community service language in the committee
reports or in the hearings.115 The provision was only briefly mentioned, but not
discussed, on the Senate floor before the reauthorizing legislation was finally
passed. 116
The plain meaning of the amended statute is to impose a general require-
ment of availability, a requirement which thereafter became known as a "com-
munity service" requirement. Again, the legislative history of this language,
like that of the 1946 provision, is sparse. Congress was primarily concerned
with revisions of the broader substantive provisions of the program and was
to conform to President Johnson's original bill, the Senate bill, S.2431, incorporated the broader
community service language used by the House in H.R. 10041, not the narrow language
originally proposed by the administration. See notes 110-11 supra.
In the only testimony relevant to the community service issue, the American Medical
Association, in a prepared statement, once again asked that the community service language be
amended to limit its application only to race, color, or creed. 1964 Senate Hearings, supra, at 174.
There was no further discussion of this point and no subsequent amendment.
115 The Senate report described the "community service" language, with no further
elaboration, in the following manner:
Such regulations shall require that the State plan provide for adequate
hospitals and other medical facilities for all persons residing in the State and that the State
plan provide for adequate hospitals and other medical facilities to furnish needed
services for persons unable to pay. Regulations may also require that a State agen-
cy, before recommending approval of an application for a project under this title,
receive assurance from the applicant that the facility or portion of the facility to be
constructed or modernized will be available to all persons residing in the territorial area of
the applicant.
S. REP. No. 1274, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 49-50, reprinted in 1964 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
2800, 2809 (emphasis added).
116 H.R. 10041 was passed by the Senate on August 1, 1964, with virtually no discus-
sion. 110 CONG. REc. 17,713 (1964), and signed into law on August 18, 1964. Id. at 20,609.
There was only one reference to community service or charity care on the Senate floor. Im-
mediately preceding the vote on H.R. 10041, Senator Javits (Rep. N.Y.) commented on the
"community service" language as it had been amended in the House bill:
Early this year the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that the
provision was unconstitutional in the case of two Hill-Burton hospitals in North
Carolina, and the Supreme Court denied certiorari. I then attempted unsuc-
cessfully, to learn from HEW what they proposed to do with their regulations in
view of the fourth circuit decision. It has been my position throughout that no fur-
ther legislation was necessary except to remove the invalid language from the
books; even without legislation the executive branch has a clear obligation, in my
judgment, to disregard unconstitutional legislative directions and to enforce the
law in accordance with constitutional requirements.
In the amended Hill-Burton measure proposed to the Congress by the Ex-
ecutive early this year, the separate-but-equal language was eliminated from what
was now section 603(e) of the act. As the measure was passed by the House, and as
it is now reported to the Senate by the Labor and Public Welfare Committee, both
the separate-but-equal language and the antidiscrimination language which had
preceded it are eliminated from the act. What is left is the requirement that a State
plan shall provide adequate hospitals and facilities "for all persons residing in the
State" and that assurance shall be received by the State from the applicant that the
federally aided facility "will be made available to all persons residing in the ter-
ritorial area of the applicant."
110 CONG. REc. 17,713 (1964). See also id. at 4183-85 (exchange of correspondence between
Senator Javits and HEW Secretary Celebrezze, recorded earlier in Senate deliberations).
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forced to act quickly. Nevertheless, there is no doubt that this particular
language in both its broad and narrow interpretations was specifically dis-
cussed, albeit briefly. Congress opted for the broader meaning. The prohibi-
tion of racial discrimination and conformance to the Simkins case was one major
concern, but Congress rejected repeated and vocal suggestions to prohibit
racial discrimination but not to require general availability. 117 A priori, it is
clear that both proponents and opponents of the broader language understood
that language to impose a substantive condition on recipient facilities.",
Moreover, HEW, after initially asking for the narrower language, immediately
issued new interpretive regulations clearly conforming to the broader inter-
pretation and specifying what "available to all" would mean. 1" 9
Ironically, the 1974 health planning legislation, 20 which effectively ter-
minated the Hill-Burton program and may have marked the end of direct
federal subsidies for health facilities construction, also gives a clear indication
of Congress' intent to impose a broadly defined community service obligation
on recipients of Hill-Burton funding and to insure enforcement of that obliga-
tion. The 1974 legislation attached a community service obligation to the
receipt of funds under the new health facility construction fund program.1
2
1
The legislation also mandated a more rigorous federal enforcement effort for
both the new program's obligations and the charity care obligations imposed
on recipients of Hill-Burton programs, 22 and required new federal regulations
interpreting those obligations. 23 The statute's legislative history demonstrates
that Congress intended these provisions to mean what they literally
required. 24 There can be no doubt, therefore, that in 1974, Congress
117 See notes 110-11 supra.
118 Id.
119 See note 110 supra.
120 See discussion in text at notes 51-55 supra.
121 See explanation of the new and slightly modified community service obligations im-
posed on recipients of funds under the new health facility construction program authorized in
1974, at note 14 supra.
122 See note 5 supra.
123 See note 54 supra, and notes 153-55 infra.
124 As with the legislative processes examined above, Congress was obviously concerned
with a myriad of issues in 1974 and focused mainly on the primary programs incorporated into
the 1974 legislation, not the relatively narrow issue of concern to this article. Further, Congress'
consideration of the bill was convoluted by the rush to reauthorize the program before the session
expired. Nonetheless, the legislative history leaves a clear picture of congressional intent with
regard to community service.
The 1974 legislation began with the introduction in the Senate of S.2994 in February,
1974. The Senate Subcommittee on Health of the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare held
two different sets of public hearings on S.2994 and related health planning bills in March and
June. See Hearings on S.2994, S.3139, S.2796, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974); Hearings on S.2983,
S.3577, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974).
Both the uncompensated service obligations and the community service obligation and
the problems with their enforcement were discussed extensively, leaving no question but that the
meaning of the "community service" language and the history of its enforcement were brought
to Congress' attention. See, e.g., Hearings on S.3577, S.2983 at 43 and 49 (statement of Charles D.
Edwards, Assistant Secretary of HEW), 89-94 (statement of Harold Graning, Health Resources
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understood the community service obligation of Hill-Burton recipients to be a
substantive condition requiring funded facilities to be generally available, i.e.,
to provide what was then known as "community service." Congress felt that
the community service requirement was so important that it mandated a
Administration), 135 (statement of representative of the American Hospital Association), and
147-202 (statement of Marilyn G. Rose).
Following the subcommittee hearings, a substitute to S.2994 was offered by amendment,
effectively combining elements from the various health planning bills pending before the subcom-
mittee. The amended S.2994 included two references relevant to the community service obliga-
tion: (1) projects to be funded were required "to make reasonable assurance that at all times after
the facility or portion thereof to be constructed or modernized will be made available to all per-
sons residing or employed in the area served by the facility. . . ." See § 603(b)(10); see also
notes 13-14 supra; (2) several related provisions requiring the Secretary of HEW to establish an
enforcement program and a procedure for processing complaints concerning assurances received
under this program and the previous Hill-Burton program. See §§ 620 and 621; for explanation
and full text, see note 15 supra.
This amended S.2994 was reported to the Senate floor; there was no further mention in
the Senate Committee report of the "community service" language. See S. REP. No. 1285, 93d
Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWs 7842. On the Senate floor, the
bill was amended several times, but not with respect to the charity care obligations, and S.2994
was pissed on November 25, 1974. 120 CONG. REC. 37,244 (1974). There was no discussion on
the floor relevant to the community service obligation or the uncompensated service obligation.
In the House, seven days of public hearings were held before the Subcommittee on
Health of the House Interstate and Foreign Commerce Committee. The subcommittee redrafted
a number of pending bills into a "clean bill" sponsored jointly by all the members of the subcom-
mittee. This bill, H.R. 16204, was reported favorably by the full committee to the House floor.
See H.R. REP. No. 1382, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1974).
The House report explains this "community service" language in H.R. 16204,
language that was subsequently adopted into the conference version of the bill and which was
eventually enacted, as follows:
This section and the requirement of section 1502(a)(5) respecting the pro-
vision of adequate medical facilities for all of a state's residents and the provision
of services to poor people are intended by the Committee as extensions of the
authority presently found in section 603(e) of the Public Health Service Act and
are not intended to change the effect or application of that section to existing pro-
jects or to require a different effect or application for projects assisted under Title
XV than has been the case for projects assisted under Title VI.
H.R. REP. No. 1382, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 94 (1974).
In the House, S.2994 prompted a complicated and somewhat laborious debate. Even-
tually S.2994 was passed on December 13, 1974, but only after being amended to replace the en-
tire body of the bill with H.R. 16204, the House version of the bill with some amendments. See
120 CONG. REc. 39,598-635 (1974). Understandably, there was no mention in the floor debate
of the charity care obligations or any discussion relevant to community service.
In the waning hours of the congressional term, the competing versions of S.2994 were
submitted to a joint conference committee. 120 CONG. REc. 40,117, 40,846 (1974). The con-
ference managers somehow managed to broker an agreement on the 50-plus page bill. See CONF.
REP. NO. 1640, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWs 7971. The
compromise bill was then passed in the Senate on December 19, 120 CONG. REc. 41,175 (1974),
and in the House, 120 CONG. REC. 41,855 (1974). Again, there was no discussion of either of the
charity care obligations in the floor debates incident to the enactment of the conference bill.
The conference report, while not providing a textual account of the interplay over the
community service obligation, does establish that the various provisions from the two competing
bills relating to charity care and charity care enforcement reflected substantial differences. The
final version of the bill adopted the House language in § 1602(b), but the Senate language (with
slight modification) in § 1604 and 1612. See CONFERENCE REP. No. 1640 at 24-26, reprinted in
1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 7995-98. For full text of this language in its final form, see
notes 14-15 supra.
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renewed federal enforcement effort and called for additional interpretive
regulations even at a time when the original Hill-Burton program was being
dismantled. 125 Similarly, in 1979126 Congress again expressed its continuing
recognition of the community service requirement of Hill-Burton recipients
and the need for its enforcement by reauthorizing the relevant provisions cited
above, 127 again leaving a clear legislative history of its intent. 128 Congress also
provided further administrative tools to secure compliance by empowering cer-
tificate of need programs to consider community service in making decisions on
certificate of need applications.
129
125 In one of the more creative attempts to dismiss the implications of the 1974 legisla-
tion, one critic of charity care enforcement described Congress as reacting "emotionally" in
1974 and attempting to use the Hill-Burton program charity care obligation as a sub rosa means
for extending Medicaid and Medicare coverage. See Maryland Note, supra note 30, at 345. Emo-
tional or not, the intent of Congress is quite dearly stated in the legislative history, whatever
political interpretation the note's author prefers to divine from between the lines: Congress was
attempting to provide for the enforcement of what it viewed as a pre-existing obligation.
126 Health Planning and Resource Development Amendments of 1979, Pub. L. No.
96-79, 93 Stat. 592 (1979), reauthorizing and revising the 1974 health planning legislation.
127 The 1979 health planning amendment recodified the pre-existing charity care provi-
sions, continuing these obligations as a condition on recipients of health facility development
funds. See note 14 supra. Significantly, the 1979 legislation also recodified and strengthened the
provisions providing for enforcement of both the Hill-Burton charity care obligations and the
parallel obligations created under the new facility construction program. See note 15 supra.
128 The significance of various references to community service must be viewed in their
specific context of the congressional deliberations. The 1979 health planning amendments were
first submitted in the Senate in February, 1979. S. 544, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979). Lengthy
hearings were held and S. 544 was reported to the Senate floor on April 26, 1979. 125 CONG.
REC. S.4811 (daily ed. April 26, 1979). S. 544 as reported included the language reauthorizing
community service and related provisions providing for its enforcement as described in notes
14-15 supra, and made explicit reference to community service and the committee's concern that
compliance be secured. S. REP. No. 96, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 91, reprinted in 1979 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 1278, 1396. The Senate report also noted the importance of the newly-
created authority of certificate of need programs to consider community service. See note 129 in-
fra. The Senate acted quickly on S. 544, leaving the provisions described above intact with no
discussion relating to community service. 125 CONG. Rc. S5113-25 (daily ed. May 1, 1979).
In the House, S. 544 was referred to the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign
Commerce. 125 CONG. REC. H2721 (daily ed. May 4, 1979). That committe, however, reported
back its own bill, H.R. 3917, which was similar in many regards to S. 544. 125 CONG. REC.
H6213 (daily ed. Jul. 19, 1979). H.R. 3917 included the same provisions described in notes
14-15 supra relating to community service enforcement, as well as those relating to consideration
of community service compliance by certificate of need programs, as described in note 129 infra.
See H.R. REP. No. 190, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 73, 95 (1979). Significantly, the House report
specifically criticized HEW for not moving more quickly to enforce community service and to
issue new regulations as mandated in 1974. Id. at 95.
On the House floor, H.R. 3917 was amended in various ways not relevant to the issue
discussed herein, and was passed; then S. 544 was amended to delete all of it and add the body of
H.R. 3917. 125 CONG. REc. H6248 (daily ed. Jul. 19, 1979). The debate on the amendments
was unrelated to community service. Likewise, the joint conference that followed and related
procedures on the floor had no discussion of community service or any impact on the provisions
discussed above. See 125 CONG. REc. H8233 (daily ed. Sept. 20, 1979); 125 CONG. REc. S13130
(daily ed. Sept. 21, 1979).
In short, the final bill included the various provisions relating to community service cited
above as they were reported and discussed in the committee reports. That discussion, however
brief, is quite clear as to Congress' intent.
129 The 1979 amendments also empowered state certificate of need programs to consider
community service compliance by applicant facilities in making certificate of need decisions. See
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It remains unclear, then, whether the community service provision re-
quired general availability of medical services or merely prohibited racial
discrimination before its amendment in 1964. Both the original declaration of
purpose and structure of the bill, however, support the broader interpretation.
In any event, the 1964 amendments, which consciously omitted any reference
to race, creed, or national origin, clearly envisioned a broad, general availabili-
ty requirement. The reaffirmation of congressional support for rigorous en-
forcement of the community service obligation in 1974 and 1979 further but-
tresses such an interpretation.
III. THE VALIDITY OF THE "COMMUNITY SERVICE" REGULATIONS
The analysis presented thus far has attempted to demonstrate that the
Hill-Burton program imposes an affirmative obligation upon funded facilities
to engage in community service, and requires general availability of medical
services to the community as a whole. For the 1979 community service regula-
tions to be upheld, however, it must also be proven that the regulations are a
proper exercise of authority granted by the statute. The 1979 regulations are
vulnerable to two lines of attack: first, that the present interpretation of the
community service obligation is beyond the scope of the authority created by
the statutory delegation; and second, that the present regulations cannot be ap-
plied retroactively to recipient facilities without impairing the contract or prop-
erty rights created at the time funding was originally received. 130
This section will trace briefly the development of the community service
regulations and the history of their enforcement culminating in the 1979
regulations. Once the events, beginning in 1947, which lead to the promulga-
tion of the 1979 community service regulations have been put in perspective, it
will be shown that the 1979 regulations are valid interpretations of the statutory
obligation and not the retroactive establishment of new obligations.
A. The Regulatory Histoiy
The original regulations issued in 1947 exercised the permissive "may re-
quire" language of the original authorizing statute, thus making the communi-
ty service obligation mandatory on recipient facilities.13 1 The regulations mere-
Public Health Service Act, § 1532(c)(6) as amended by Pub. L. No. 96-79, § 116(f)(6)(E), 93 Stat.
613 (1979). The language states only that an agency can consider the extent to which "proposed
services will be accessible to all residents of the area to be served." See note 15 supra. The com-
mittee reports indicate that this is specifically intended to provide certificate of need agencies with
a means by which to secure compliance by applicants with their Hill-Burton community service
obligations. See H.R. REP. No. 190, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 73 (1979). See also S. REp. No. 96,
96th Cong., 1st Sess. 69, reprinted in 1979 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 1374. See explanation
relating to the House bill and Senate bill in note 128 supra.
130 If a regulation effectively creates new responsibilities for funded facilities that were
not part of the original agreement at the time of the funding, then the retroactive application of
such a regulation could be challenged on both constitutional and contractual principles. See
Vanderbilt Note, supra note 30, at 1480-94. See also discussion and cases cited in American Hosp.
Ass'n v. Harris, 625 F.2d 1328, 1341-42 (7th Cir. 1980).
131 The original Hill-Burton regulations, defining the charity care obligations, read as
follows:
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ly reiterated verbatim the statutory language, however, giving no indication of
how "available to all" would be defined, and, perhaps more significantly, giv-
ing no indication of how either of the charity care obligations would be
monitored or enforced.
13 2
In 1964, after the amendment to the statutory language required by the
Simkins ruling, HEW issued new regulations.1 3 3 These regulations provided the
§53.6 General. The State plan shall provide for adequate hospital facili-
tiesfor the people residing in a State without discrimination on account of race, creed, or color
and shall provide for adequate hospital facilities for persons unable to pay therefor.
S 53.6 Non-discrimination. Before a construction application is recom-
mended by a State Agency for approval, the State Agency shall obtain assurance
from the applicant that the facilities to be built with aid under the act will be made
available without discrimination on account of race, creed, or color to all persons residing in the
area to be served by that hospital. However, in any area where separate hospital
facilities are provided for separate population groups, the State Agency may waive
the requirement of assurance from the construction applicant if(a) it finds that the
plan otherwise makes equitable provision on the basis of need for facilities and
services of like quality for each such population group in the area, and (b) such
finding is subsequently approved by the Surgeon General. Facilities provided
under the Federal Act will be considered as making equitable provision for
separate population groups when the facilities to be built for the group less well
provided for heretofore are equal to the proportion of such group in the total
population of the area, except that the State plan shall not program facilities for a
separate population group for construction beyond the level of adequacy for such
group.
§ 53.63 Hospital servicers for persons unable to pay therefor. Before a
construction application is recommended by a State Agency for approval, the State
Agency shall obtain assurance that the applicant will furnish a reasonable volume
of free patient care. As used in this section, "free patient care" means hospital
service offered below cost or free to persons unable to pay therefor, including
under "persons unable to pay therefor," both the legally indigent and persons
who are otherwise self-supporting but are unable to pay the full cost of needed
hospital care. Such care may be paid for wholly or partly out of public funds or
contributions of individuals and private and charitable organizations such as com-
munity chests or may be contributed at the expense of the hospital itself. In deter-
mining what constitutes a reasonable volume of free patient care, there shall be
considered conditions in the area to be served by the applicant, including the
amount of free care that may be available otherwise than through the applicant.
The requirement of assurance from the applicant may be waived if the applicant
demonstrates to the satisfaction of the State Agency, subject to subsequent ap-
proval by the Surgeon General, that furnishing such free patient care is not feasi-
ble financially.
42 C.F.R. § 53.62-63 (1949) (emphasis added). Sections 53.61-63 were recodified without
substantial amendment into two sections, 5 53.111-112, in 1956. 21 Fed. Reg. 9841 (1956).
132 There were a few instances in which HEW took action to enforce community service
in its broader sense even prior to the 1964 statutory amendments and subsequent regulations.
Apparently in 1963 HEW took the position that Group Health Cooperative of Puget Sound (a
"closed" prepaid group practice) could not received Hill-Burton funds because it was not open
to everyone. See Cook v. Ochsner Found. Hosp., 61 F.R.D. 354, 363 (E.D. La. 1970). Thus, on
at least one occasion prior to 1964 HEW indicated its willingness to interpret "available to all" in
its broader sense.
133 It should be noted that while the statutory authorization for the community service
regulations is permissive, the issuance of regulations immediately following the 1946 legislation
and again following the 1964 amendments made the obligation, however vaguely defined, man-
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first specific interpretation of the community service obligation.13 4 In order to
comply with the statute, funded facilities were required to refrain from
discriminating on the basis of race, creed, color, or national origin, and to fur-
nish community service. 135 "Community service," as defined by the 1964
datory on receipt facilities. See note 131 supra.
134 The former §§ 53.111-112 were expanded into three sections following the Sirkins
decision, see note 103 supra, and the amendments to the Hill-Burton statute. 29 Fed. Reg. 18,447
(1964). Although the charity care obligations as interpreted by earlier regulations were reorgan-
ized, the only major substantive change was a reinterpretation of the "available to all" language,
including, for the first time, the use of the term "community service." As amended, the charity
care regulations read:
S 53.111 Community service; services for persons unable to pay; nondis-
crimination on account of creed. Before an application for the construction of a
hospital or medical facility is recommended by a State agency for approval, the
State agency shall obtain assurance from the applicant that:
(a) The facility Will furnish a community service;
(b) The facility will furnish below cost or without charge a reasonable
volume of services to persons unable to pay therefor. As used in this paragraph,
"persons unable to pay therefor" includes persons who otherwise are self-
supporting but are unable to pay the full cost of needed services. Such services
may be paid for wholly or partly out of public funds or contributions of individuals
and private and charitable organizations such as community chest or may be con-
tributed at the expense of the facility as itself. In determining what constitutes a
reasonable volume of services to persons unable to pay therefor, there shall be con-
sidered conditions in the area to be served by the applicant, including the amount
of such services that may be available otherwise than through the applicant. The
requirements of assurance from the applicant may be waived if the applicant
demonstrates to the satisfaction of the State agency, subject to subsequent ap-
proval by the Surgeon General, that to furnish such services is not feasible finan-
cially; and
(c) All portions and services of the entire facility for the construction of
which, or in connection with which, aid under the Federal Act is sought, will be
made available without discrimination on account of creed; and no professionally
qualified person will be discriminated against on account of creed with respect to
the privilege of professional practice in the facility.
§ 53.112 Nondiscrimination on account of race, color, or national origin.
Attention is called to the requirements of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
(78 Stat. 242; P.L. 88-352) which provides that no person in the United States
shall, on the ground of race, color, or national origin be excluded from participa-
tion in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any pro-
gram or activity receiving Federal financial assistance (sec. 601). A regulation im-
plementing such Tide VI, applicable to grants for construction and modernization
of hospitals and medical facilities, has been issued by the Secretary of Health,
Education, and Welfare with the approval of the President (45 CFR Part 80). This
regulation, published in the Federal Register of December 4, 1964 (29 F.R.
16298-16305), will become effective on the 30th day after such publication.
§ 53.113 Nondiscrimination in construction contracts. Each construc-
tion contract is subject to the condition that the grantee shall comply with the re-
quirements of, and give the assurances required in Executive Order 11114, June
22, 1963 (28 F.R. 6485), and the applicable rules, regulations and procedures
prescribed pursuant thereto by the President's Committee on Equal Employment
Opportunity (28 F.R. 9812).
Note that the reference to community service in § 53.111(a) is further defined by § 53.1(p). See
note 136 infra.
135 See note 134 supra.
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regulations, meant "that (1) the services furnished are available to the general
public or (2) admission is limited only on the basis of age, medical indigency,
or type or kind of mental or medical disability. ' 136 HEW also adopted the view
that the essential obligation remained unchanged by the statutory amendment,
except for the elimination of the "separate-but-equal" exception. Thus, the
agency considered the new regulations applicable to all recipient facilities, in-
cluding those that received funding prior to 1964.137 As with earlier charity care
regulations, however, the 1964 regulations made no provision for monitoring
or enforcing compliance with the charity care obligations.
The regulations as amended in 1964 remained unchanged and, un-
doubtedly, unenforced, for nearly ten years. 138 In fact, for the first 25 years of
the program, none of the federal or state Hill-Burton agencies took action to in-
terpret the meaning of these obligations, nor is there any evidence of govern-
ment efforts to monitor or enforce compliance. 139 Until 1972, the federal
regulations implementing the Hill-Burton program did little more than restate
the charity care provision of the statute, and similar language was appended in-
to state Hill-Burton plans and individual grants without further elaboration. 1
40
In the early 1970's, however, a series of privately-initiated lawsuits forced
HEW to give more than pro forma recognition to the charity care
obligations. 141 As a result, HEW reluctantly issued interpretive regulations in
1972 specifying the meaning of the obligation to provide uncompensated serv-
ice. More critically, the 1972 regulations outlined a program for monitoring
compliance by Hill-Burton facilities, relying heavily on state agencies for its
implementation. 142 HEW specifically declined the opportunity to amend or to
136 42 C.F.R. § 53.1(p), as added by 29 Fed. Reg. 18,449 (1964) defined "community
service" to mean:
. . . the (1) services furnished are available to the general public or (2)
admission is limited only on the basis of age, medical indigency, or the type or
kind of medical or mental disability, or (3) the facility constitutes a medical or nur-
sing care unit of a home or other institution which home or other institution is
available in accordance with subparagraph (1) or (2) of this paragraph.
Id.
137 See explanation given later by HEW. 43 Fed. Reg. 49,954 (1978).
138 See Cook v. Ochsner Found. Hosp., 61 F.R.D. 354, 361-62 (E.D. La. 1972). Among
other things, the court found that during the preceding 25 years there had not been any federal
personnel assigned to investigate or enforce the charity care assurances and there had not been
any federal process for handling individual complaints or issuing interpretations with regard to
individual facilities. See also Newsom v. Vanderbilt Univ., 453 F. Supp. 401, 409 (M.D. Tenn.
1978).
'39 See Rose, supra note 30, at 169. See also Newsom v. Vanderbilt Univ., 453 F. Supp.
at 409.
140 See 42 C.F.R. § 53 (1947). See also 42 C.F.R. § 53 (1971).
141 See, e.g., Cook v. Ochsner Found. Hosp., 559 F.2d 968 (5th Cir. 1977) (note two
earlier decisions: 319 F. Supp. 603 (E.D. La. 1970) and 61 F.R.D. 354 (E.D. La. 1972)); Euresti
v. Stenner, 458 F.2d 1115 (10th Cir. 1972); Organized Migrants in Community Action v. James
Archer Smith Hosp., 325 F. Supp. 268 (S.D. Fla. 1971); Perry v. Greater Southeast Wash.
Hosp. Found., No. 721-71 (D.C. June 28, 1972). See also Saine v. Hospital Auth. of Hall Coun-
ty, 502 F.2d 1033 (5th Cir. 1974).
142 These charity care regulations were first issues in interim form, 37 Fed. Reg. 14,179
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specify the meaning of community service, however. 143 Subsequent litigation
by private consumer groups again attacked the adequacy of the government's
efforts, 14 4 resulting in further amendments to the uncompensated service regu-
lations in 1975.145
It was not until 1974 - and again under court order 14 1 - that HEW
(1972). The final version (with slight changes) was issued in 1973. 38 Fed. Reg. 16,353 (1973).
For a discussion of the circumstances leading to their initial issuance, see Rose, supra note 30, at
174-76; Rosenblatt, supra note 30, at 270-77.
143 37 Fed. Reg. 14,720 (1972). See Rose, supra note 30, at 178. The 1972 regulation (ac-
tually finalized in 1973, see Rose, supra note 30, at 177 n.57) did recodify the references to com-
munity service and the prohibitions on discrimination on the basis of race, color, or national
origin, in effect, renumbering § 53.111-113. However, there were no substantive changes in the
community service provisions in 1972, other than in the substantive requirements regarding the
"free care" obligation.
144 See Corum v. Beth Israel Medical Center, 373 F. Supp. 550 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), and
related decisions, Corum v. Beth Israel Medical Center, 373 F. Supp. 558 (S.D.N.Y. 1974),
Corum v. Beth Israel Medical Center, 359 F. Supp. 909 (S.D.N.Y. 1973). See also Rose, supra
note 30, at 194-201.
145 40 Fed. Reg. 46,203 (1975), amending provisions relating to billing patients prior to
uncompensated service determinations.
146 Cook v. Ochsner Found. Hosp., 61 F.R.D. 354 (E.D. La. 1972). The findings of the
court read in part:
The defendant Secretary, who is the Federal government official responsi-
ble for implementing the Hill-Burton program, has failed to insure that Hill-
Burton hospitals meet their obligations to treat all persons in the territorial area in
providing a community service. The defendant Secretary has not issued any rul-
ings, regulations, standards, or taken any specific action with respect to these
hospitals, nor to this Court's knowledge, as to any other hospital, to see to it that
they terminate their practices and/or policies of excluding substantially all
Medicaid beneficiaries. The failure of the Secretary of Health, Education, and
Welfare to "prescribe regulations" which would prohibit such discriminatory ad-
mission practices by the defendant hospitals is in disregard of the provisions and
intent of the Hill-Burton Act.
Id. at 361.
In a related case, Perry v. Greater Southeast Wash. Community Found., No. 725-71
(D.D.C. June 28, 1972), the federal district court for the District of Columbia came to a similar
conclusion with regard to the adequacy of the existing federal regulations, holding that the inade-
quacy of the federal community service regulations prevented a determination of whether or not
the defendant hospital was in compliance with its community service obligation, While holding
that the interpretation of "community service" was properly a matter for the federal ad-
ministrative agency, the court did make several relevant observations. First, the court was of the
opinion that the "available to all" language in the statute prior to 1964 was only a proscription of
discrimination on the basis of race, creed, or color; not an affirmative obligation to provide
something called "community service." Id. at 5-6. The court recognized, however, that the 1964
amendments and the regulations to follow did impose such an affirmative obligation on recipient
facilities, albeit an obligation that the federal agency would have to specify in order to enforce. Id.
at 6. In the language of the court:
There are not standards by which the Court could determine whether whatever
community services the hospital performs are or are not reasonably related to the
standard; and without that, there is no way that the Court can function except by
considering itself some kind of an administrative agency in a rule-making and ad-
ministative process, which is not the role of the Court.
Id.
Thus, the district court did not rule that the broader interpretation of "community serv-
ice" could not be imposed on facilities funded after 1964, only that without specification the en-
forcement could not be pursued by private litigants through the courts. For further discussion,
see Rosenblatt, supra note 30, at 274-75.
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finally issued regulations further interpreting the community service obliga-
tion. 147 The major substantive revision added by the 1974 regulations was to
specify that community service included the requirements that recipient
facilities must participate in Medicaid and Medicare, and must take "such
steps as necessary" to insure that Medicaid and Medicare patients were admit-
ted without discrimination.1 48 But while the 1974 regulations clarified the
meaning implied in the community service provisions of the 1964 regulations,
they stopped short of imposing explicit standards for assessing compliance with
the substantive requirements. 149 In addition, monitoring and enforcement pro-
147 39 Fed. Reg. 31,767 (1974).
148 42 C.F.R. § 53.113(d), as added by 39 Fed. Reg. 31,767 (1974), read in part:
In order to comply with its community service assurance an applicant
must:
(1) (i) Make the services it furnished available to general public, or
(ii) Limit the availability of such services only on the basis of age,
medical indigenicy, or type or kind of medical or mental disability, or
(iii) If the facility constitutes a medical or nursing care unit of a home
or other institution, make such home or other institution available in accordance
with paragraph (d)(1)(i) or (ii) of this section; and
(2) (i) Make arrangements, if eligible to do so, for reimbursement for
services with: (A) Those principal State and local governmental third-party payors
which provide reimbursement for services that is not less than the actual cost of
such services as determined in accordance with accepted cost accounting prin-
ciples; and (B) Those Federal governmental third-party programs, such as
Medicare and Medicaid, to the extent that the applicant is entitled to reimburse-
ment at reasonable cost under a formula established in accordance with applicable
Federal law.
(ii) Take such additional steps as may be necessary to ensure that ad-
mission to and services of the facility will be available to beneficiaries of the
governmental programs specified in paragraph (2)(i) without discrimination (or
preference) on account of their being such beneficiaries.
As noted earlier, see note 146 supra, the federal district court in Cook v. Ochsner man-
dated this substantive amendment. The court declined, however, to rule on plaintiff's argument
that as a matter of law a policy to accept only patients who had a private physician on the
facility's medical staff violated the obligation as well, holding that the issue would have to be tried
and would be dependent on individual circumstances. 61 F.R.D. at 359-60. This issue is resolved
in the 1979 community service regulations. See 42 C.F.R. § 125.603(d)(1) (1980), set forth at note
172 infra.
It is also worth noting that the nine hospital defendants (in addition to HEW) in the Cook
litigation agreed to take various steps to accept Medicaid patients under a stipulated settlement
entered into prior to trial on the community service issue. 61 F.R.D. at 354-55. Apparently, they
acceded to an interpretation of "community service" that included an obligation to provide serv-
ices to Medicaid patients prior to the issuance of the 1974 regulations. For a discussion of this in-
terpretation of "community service," see Rosenblatt, supra note 30, at 279.
149 In many respects, it appears that HEW was trying to imply standards and specify
meaning without explicitly doing so. For example, the regulations in proposed form would have
required recipients to make arrangements with private third party payors, but the specific re-
quirement was dropped in the final regulations as both "infeasible and unnecessary." According
to the explanatory material that accompanied the final regulations, HEW felt it could not develop
specific regulatory language which would not disrupt the reimbursement relationship between
providers and most private insurers. 39 Fed. Reg. 31,766 (1974). However, that same explana-
tion claims that HEW felt such a provision, in any event, was unnecessary, since arrangements
with private third party payors would be compelled under the general language of § 53.113(d)(1).
Id.
As another example of HEW's lack of specificity, the term "without discrimination"
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cedures were only generally referred to in the 1974 regulations, and almost
total discretion was given to the state Hill-Burton agencies to develop methods
for evaluation and enforcement of this obligation. 150 The 1974 regulations also
limited the duration of the community service obligation to 20 years.151 This
provision, however, was invalidated by a federal district court in 1977 and
HEW has acceded to that position ever since.1 5 2
In 1978, HEW proposed new charity care regulations, ostensibly under
the mandate of the 1974 health planning legislation'5 3 but clearly prodded as
well by the continuing efforts of private consumer groups.1 5 4 The new regula-
tions were intended to give more specific meaning to the terms of the un-
compensated and community service obligations, 155 and to federalize the en-
was used, but no clear guidelines for measuring discrimination were included. See 42 C.F.R. §
53.113(e) (1975). The explanatory language in the introductory material of the federal regula-
tions added some indication of what was intended but still stopped short of specific meaning:
Beneficiaries of the covered programs must thus be considered for admis-
sion to and treatment in each facility on an equal basis with persons who pay their
charges through other means, in accordance with the policies which are generally
applicable to patients of the facility. Steps designed to ensure this result might in-
clude, for example, notification to physicians on the facility's staff that
beneficiaries of the covered programs are eligible for admission in accordance with
the institution's normal admission procedures.
39 Fed. Reg. 31,767 (1974). See notes 163-74 infra for a comparison of similar provisions in the
1979 regulations.
150 See 42 C.F.R. 5 53.113(e)-l 13(g) (1975). Until 1978 HEW and its predecessors had
taken the position that enforcement of the charity care obligations was primarily a matter for state
Hill-Burton agencies, as were most other administrative aspects of the program. See Cook v.
Ochsner Found. Hosp., 61 F.R.D. 354, 364 (E.D. La. 1972), Lugo v. Simon, 426 F. Supp. 28,
31 (N.D. Ohio 1976). While that position seems consistent with the general scheme contemplated
by the statute, it hardly explains the virtual silence of the regulations on matters such as methods
for determining compliance, or enforcement activities, or even data collection. Moreover, the
state agencies, apparently taking the lead from their federal counterparts, did not in any mean-
ingful way carry out their responsibility for charity care enforcement. Testimony given at the
1978 hearings almost uniformly describes the state enforcement activities as non-existent, almost
to the point that strains credulity. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE,
TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS: PUBLIC HEARINGS ON PROPOSED HILL-BURTON REGULA-
TIONS December 5-6 (1979) (two volumes). See, e.g., testimony of Edward Tetelman, Vol. II at
115; Dolores Bullert, Vol. II at 191; Tony Whitson, Vol. II at 228. See also Rose, supra note 30, at
186-94.
151 42 C.F.R. § 53.113(a) (1975).
152 Lugo v. Simon, 426 F. Supp. 28, 36 (N.D. Ohio 1976). See 43 Fed. Reg. 49,955
(1978). Section 53.113(e) was amended accordingly. 42 Fed. Reg. 16,780 (1977). A similar
limitation was imposed on the free care obligation by the 1972 amendments to the charity care
regulations, but it has been held to be valid by both the Cook and Lugo courts. See 42 C.F.R. §
53.111(a) (1975).
153 See note 15 supra.
154 43 Fed. Reg. 49,954-56 (1978). Both Newsom v. Vanderbilt, 653 F.2d 1100, 1105
(6th Cir. 1981) and Lugo v. Simon, 453 F. Supp. 677, 686 (N.D. Ohio 1978) interpreted the
1974 legislation to require new charity care regulations. Both parties in Lugo agreed to a stipula-
tion settlement under which HEW would develop new regulations and under which the 1979
regulations were issued. See Fiori, Bureau of Health Facilities Increasing Responsibilities in Assuring
Medical Carefor the Needy and Services Without Discrimination, 95 PUBLIC HEALTH REPORTS 164, 167
(1980).
155 The explanatory materials that accompanied the proposed and final regulations em-
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forcement and monitoring responsibilities.15 6 Indeed the language of the pro-
posed and final regulations and the voluminous explanatory material that ac-
companied the regulations 157 reflected an unusual frankness by HEW both in
describing the inadequate enforcement efforts of the past and in affirming the
agency's intent to come to grips with these controversial obligations and
establish meaningful enforcement procedures.
158
In their broadest outlines, the new regulations added nothing to the
substantive definition of community service, at least as it has been defined
since 1964. Recipients 159 of Hill-Burton assistance from both the Hill-Burton
program and the new program established in 1974160 are essentially required to
make their services available to all residents of the area they serve, 161 without
discrimination on the basis of race, color, creed, national origin 162 or on any
phasized that the new regulations were attempts to clarify the existing obligations, rather than
adopt new substantive standards. See 44 Fed. Reg. 29,397-99 (1979). For example, the specific
requirements of 9 124.603(a) are described as making explicit what was implied in pre-existing
53.113(d)(1). Id. at 29,397.
158 The shift of the primary responsibility for monitoring and enforcement activities
from the state agencies to the federal agency may well be one of the most significant aspects of
these regulations from a practical point of view. Both the proposed regulations, 43 Fed. Reg.
49,956 (1978), and the final regulations, 44 Fed. Reg. 29,372 (1979), make specific reference to
congressional concern over the lax enforcement practices of many states. HEW strongly implied
that the 1974 health planning legislation mandated that these new regulations be issued and ad-
ministered by the federal agency, citing Public Health Service Act S 1612(c), as amended by Pub.
L. No. 93-641, S 4, 88 Stat. 2264 (1974). See note 15 supra for subsequent recodification of §
1612(c).
States have not, however, been totally precluded from enforcement or monitoring ac-
tivities under the 1979 regulations. Both the free service and community service regulations allow
the federal government to delegate responsibilities to state agencies under some circumstances.
See 42 C.F.R. § 124.607 (1980).
157 The final issuance of federal regulations required 38 pages of the Federal Register,
including a 17-page summary of public comments and 11 pages of economic analysis. There
were also nine pages of explanation incident to the proposed regulations. These explanatory
materials include many specific interpretations of the regulations and such things as HEW's
analysis of its own legal authority. Ironically, the economic analysis, required by executive order
as an incident to issued regulations, analyzes only the cost of uncompensated services and makes
no mention of community service. See 44 Fed. Reg. 29,399-401 (1979).
158 See, e.g., 43 Fed. Reg. 49,955 (1978).
159 While there is no definition of "federal assistance" for purposes of the community
service obligation, "federal assistance" is defined for purposes of the free service regulations as
including grants, loan guarantees, and interest subsidies. See 42 C.F.R. § 124.502 (1980).
Presumably, the same definition applies to community service.
160 The community service obligation of future recipients under the 1974 health plan-
ning legislation is slightly different. See note 14 supra.
161 "Service area" is defined for purposes of community service as the area defined in
the most recent state Hill-Burton plan. 42 G.F.R. § 124.602 (1980). This definition will lead to
controversy in some areas. Most of these plans have not been revised since Hill-Burton was effec-
tively repealed in 1974, and some may not be available at all. Apparently, HEW could not find a
more satisfactory definition of this potentially controversial issue. See 44 Fed. Reg. 29,397 (1979).
"Resident" for purposes of these regulations, is defined to include anyone living per-
manently or indefinitely in the service area, or living in the area for purposes of employment or
living with a resident family member. 42 C.F.R. § 124.603(a)(2) (1980). For an interpretation of
this definition as applied to migrants and other groups, see 44 Fed. Reg. 29,399 (1979).
162 The original charity care regulations, 42 C.F.R. § 53.61-63, later renumbered §
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other basis except narrowly prescribed factors.1 63 The critical definition under
the new regulations reads:
In order to comply with its community service assurance, a facility
shall make the services provided in the facility or portion thereof con-
structed, modernized, or converted with Federal assistance under Title VI
or XVI of the Act available to all persons residing (and, in the case of
facilities assisted under Title XVI of the Act, employed) in the facility's
service area without discrimination on the ground of race, color, national
origin, creed, or any other ground unrelated to an individual's need or the
service or the availability of the needed service in the facility. Subject to
paragraph (b) (concerning emergency services) a facility may deny services
53.11i-112, see note 131 supra, specifically prohibited discrimination on the basis of race, color,
or creed, although it allowed a "separate-but-equal" exception, reiterating the language of the
original statute. After the statutory amendments in 1964, as well as the enactment of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241, these regulations were amended, see note
134 supra, and the reference to discrimination on the basis of race, color, or creed, was replaced
by a new § 53.112 drawing attention to the 1964 civil rights legislation prohibiting discrimination
on the basis of race, color, or national origin (but not creed).
It was at that time that the first reference to community service was made, as part of a
new 5 53.111. This new § 53.111 also prohibited discrimination on the basis of creed. When the
revised free service regulations were issued in 1972, the separate provisions referring to
discrimination and community service were consolidated into a single § 53.112.
In 1974, a new § 53.113 was created for the expanded definition of community service.
Thus the race discrimination provisions which had originally been the central, and perhaps only,
focus of the regulations implemented under the statutory language "available to all," and then
partially considered as one aspect of community service, became, in effect, a third obligation,
i.e., Hill-Burton facilities must provide free service, a community service, and not discriminate
on the basis of race, color, national origin, or creed. The regulations proposed in 1978 purport to
amend § 53.111 and § 53.113, but not § 53.112. See 43 Fed. Reg. 59,954 (1978). But note that the
obligation of § 53.112 is incorporated into the new regulations as part of the community service
obligation, and the same language is used in the final community service regulation. See 42
C.F.R. § 124.603(a)(1) (1979).
To add to the confusion, HEW justified this language in the 1979 regulations, not on the
basis of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, but on the ground that discrimination on the basis of race,
creed, color, or national origin was implied in the earlier definition of community service in §
53.113(d)(1) (1977). Consistent with this reasoning, this same explanation also claims that the
reference to racial discrimination was dropped from the statute in 1964 "apparently as redun-
dant." See 43 Fed. Reg. 49,962 (1978).
In any event, discrimination on the basis of race, color, or national origin, but not creed
is also prohibited by Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000(d) (1976), and
would apply to all Hill-Burton recipients as recipients of federal funds. Consequently, the regula-
tions anticipate some overlap in enforcement responsibilities. See 43 Fed. Reg. 49,962 (1978).
163 As in previous community service regulations, see notes 151-52 supra, there is no
durational limitation on the community service obligation as defimed in the 1979 regulations. In-
terestingly, in the material accompanying the issuance of the regulations HEW contended that
because of prior judicial decisions there is no limit on the community service obligation of Tide
VI (Hill-Burton) facilities. See 44 Fed. Reg. 29,397 (1979). But HEW imposed no limit on the
community service obligation of Title XVI facilities (the new program established in 1974)
because of the "at all times" language of the 1974 legislation. See note 14 supra. It must be noted
that the regulation failed to clarify how this unlimited duration will be treated in the event of a
closure or a conversion of a facility more than twenty years after the receipt of federal assistance,
The explanatory material in the federal regulations purported to answer the question, but failed
to do so. See 44 Fed. Reg. 29,399 (1979).
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to persons who are unable to pay for them unless those persons are required
to be provided uncompensated services under the provisions of Subpart F.
A facility is out of compliance with its community service assurance if
it uses an admission policy that has the effect of excluding persons on any
ground other than those permitted under paragraph (a) of this section
164
The principal substantive difference between these community service
regulations and prior interpretive efforts lies in their level of specification. At
least since 1964, Hill-Burton facilities have been specifically prohibited from
discriminating against people who can pay for their services. 165 And, since
1946, facilities have been required by both regulation and statute to "be
available to all." ' 166 The prior regulations, however, gave little indication of
how these principles would be applied in practice. 167 Even had there been a
governmental interest in enforcing the earlier regulations, which quite plainly
there was not, there would have been no regulatory standard by which state or
federal agencies could measure compliance with community service. 168 For
that matter, the prior regulations appear purposefully to avoid addressing some
critical - and obvious - issues.
1 69
164 42 C.F.R. § 124.603(a)-(d) (1980), as amended by 44 Fed. Reg. 29,380 (1979). The
use of the term "effect" and the expression of the standard of compliance in these terms has par-
ticular significance, since the substantive obligation is defined as a proscription on "discrimina-
tion" against any resident. By explicitly defining an "effect" test for compliance, the regulation
avoids any implication that a recipient facility must also show some kind of intent or a specific
purpose as a basis for use of an exclusionary practice, an interpretation surely to be challenged
should these regulations be enforced.
165 See description of the 1964 community service regulations in text at note 136 supra.
Note that the 1964 regulations outlined a slightly different list of factors upon which admission
could be limited, but did impose ostensibly the same substantive requirements on recipient
facilities, i.e., recipient facilities were prohibited from discriminating against anyone except
under specified circumstances.
166 The regulations issued in 1947 merely reiterated the "available to all" language of
the original statute, see note 131 supra, but they did make the permissive language of the statute
mandatory and thus impose an "available to all" requirement on all subsequent recipients of
program funds.
167 There is no record that any further formal or informal interpretative materials were
ever produced, at least prior to 1972.
168 Even the 1974 community service regulations which purported to specify the mean-
ing of "community service" gave little or no indication of how compliance would be measured or
whether an "intent" or an "effects" test would be employed. For that matter, the 1974 regula-
tions were virtually silent as to the method or procedures of enforcement. See notes 148-50 supra.
169 For example, the 1974 regulations require facilities to make arrangements with
"federal governmental third party programs, such as Medicare and Medicaid, to the extent that
the applicant is entitled to reimbursement at reasonable cost under a formula established in ac-
cordance with applicable Federal law." 42 C.F.R. § 53.113(d)(2)(i)'(1975).
Given that Medicaid and Medicare had been in effect for at least eight years and that a
large portion of the American population relied on these federal programs to pay for hospital
care, it is difficult to understand how the federal agency responsible for enforcing these regula-
tions could fail to decide whether Medicaid and Medicare were, for purposes of enforcement,
"reimbursement at a reasonable cost .. . in accordance with applicable Federal law." For
other examples of obvious omissions from prior interpretive regulations, see note 149 supra.
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The new community service regulations, however, leave no doubt as to
their intent or their application to critical circumstances. By defining
"available to all" in terms of discrimination and measuring discrimination in
terms of an "effect test," the regulations quite explicitly preclude the exclusion
of anyone who is in need of the services offered by the facility 170 and is able to
make some manner of payment.17 1 This substantive standard is buttressed by a
series of illustrative examples172 which clarify the application of the standard in
170 42 C.F.R. § 124.603(a) (1980). A facility is also precluded from excluding any resi-
dent who requires emergency services even without an ability to pay. 42 C.F.R. 9 124.603(b)
(1980) reads:
(1) A facility may not deny emergency services to any person who resides (or, in
the case of facilities assisted under Title XVI of the Act, is employed) in the facili-
ty's service area on the ground that the person is unable to pay for those services.
(2) A facility may discharge a person that has received emergency services, or may
transfer the person to another facility able to provide necessary services, when the
appropriate medical personnel determine that discharge or transfer will not subject
the person to a substantial risk of deterioration in medical condition.
In addition, under these regulations, a recipient facility cannot deny services to people who can-
not pay if the facility has not satisfied its concomitant uncompensated service obligation. 42
C.F.R. § 124.603(a)(1) (1980).
171 According to the 1979 regulations, non-compliance could be demonstrated either on
the basis of an individual complaint, 42 C.F.R. § 124.606 (1980), or based on statistical in-
ferences derived by a comparison of the characteristics of the patients admitted to a facility to the
characteristics of the population of the area served by the facility. See 42 C.F.R. § 124.605 (1980).
For a full explanation of how HHS proposes to conduct such investigations, see PUBLIC HEALTH
SERVICE, DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, COMPLIANCE STANDARDS
MANUAL: UNCOMPENSATED CARE AND COMMUNITY SERVICE OBLIGATIONS (first published in
1979)..
172 The regulations list three illustrative examples:
(1) A facility has a policy or practice of admitting only those patients who are re-
ferred by physicians with staff privileges at the facility. If this policy or practice has
the effect of excluding persons who reside (or for Title XVI facilities, are
employed) in the community from the facility because they do not have a private
family doctor with staff privileges at the facility, the facility would not be in com-
pliance with its assurance. The facility is not required to abolish its staff physician
admissions policy as a usual method for admission. However, to be in compliance
with its community service assurance it must make alternative arrangements to
assist area residents who would otherwise be unable to gain admission to obtain
services available in the facility.
(2) A facility, as required, is a qualified provider under the Title XIX Medicaid
program, but few or none of the physicians with staff privileges at the facility or in
a particular department or sub-department of the facility will treat Medicaid pa-
tients. If the effect is that some Medicaid patients are excluded from the facility or
from any service provided in the facility, the facility is not in compliance with its
community service assurance. To be in compliance a facility does not have to re-
quire all of its staff physicians to accept Medicaid. However, it must take steps to
ensure that Medicaid beneficiaries have full access to all of its available services.
(3) A facility requires advance deposits (pre-admission or pre-service deposits)
before admitting or serving patients. If the effect of this practice is that some per-
sons are denied admission or service or face substantial delays in gaining admis-
sion or service solely because they do not have the necessary cash on hand, this
would constitute a violation of the community service assurance. While the facility
is not required to forego the use of a deposit policy in all situations, it is required to
make alternative arrangements to ensure that persons who probably can pay for
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several regards, anticipating important, controversial questions which will un-
doubtedly arise in any rigorous enforcement effort.
173
First, unlike earlier regulations, the 1979 regulations explicitly clarify the
obligations of Hill-Burton recipients with regard to people who rely on
Medicaid or Medicare for their payment, 174 an issue adroitly muddled by
earlier regulations. 175 Though virtually all hospitals take Medicaid and
Medicare patients, and many rely heavily on these public programs for a large
part of their revenues,17 6 some hospitals take very few Medicare and, par-
ticularly, Medicaid patients; 177 all do so with increasing reluctance.
178
the services are not denied them simply because they do not have the available
cash at the time services are requested. For example, many employed persons and
persons with other collateral do not have savings, but can pay hospital bills on an
installment basis, or can pay a small deposit. Such persons may not be excluded
from admission or denied services because of their inability to pay a deposit.
42 C.F.R. S 124.603(d)(1)-(3) (1980).
Following these illustrations are examples of "alternative arrangements" that a facility might,
but is not necessarily required to, undertake, incuding hiring additional physicians, requiring
physicians to take Medicaid or other patients, and other alterations of day-to-day hospital prac-
tices.
'73 See 44 Fed. Reg. 29,397-99 (1979) (explanatory material accompanying the regula-
tions).
'74 42 C.F.R. § 124.603(c) (1980) requires facilities to be certified as Medicaid and
Medicare providers. The illustrations that follow require further that all Medicaid and Medicare
recipients seeking treatment must be accepted. 42 C.F.R. § 124.603(d)(2) (1980).
Although it is not specifically required by the regulations, the explanatory materials that
accompany the regulations indicated that facilities must also make arrangements with private
reimbursers such as Blue Cross and Blue Shield. 44 Fed. Reg. 29,374 (1979). But there is no
specific reference to private third party payors in the text of the regulations. Such a requirement
is implied, however, by the general requirement to accept all residents who are able to pay. See 42
C.F.R. § 124.603(c) (1980). Note also that HEW earlier had taken the position that ar-
rangements with private third party payors were part of a facility's community service implied
but not stated in the federal regulations issued in 1974. See notes 145 and 169 supra.
175 See note 149 supra.
176 The American Hospital Association counted 6,293 hospitals in their national survey
in 1979. AMERICAN HOSPITAL ASSOCIATION, HosPrrAL STATISTICS: 1979, 191 (1980). Not all
of these hospitals are acute care facilities. See id. at xii. The latest government figures indicate that
6,128 acute care hospitals were certified for participation in Medicare in 1979. Id. at 2. Hence,
virtually all acute care hospitals participate. More importantly, Medicare paid for over 26% of
all hospital care in 1979. Gibson, National Health Expenditures, 1979, 2 HEALTH CARE FINANCING
REVIEW 1, 6 (1980).
Figures for the participation of hospitals in Medicaid are generally not available, except
from each individual state agency. In aggregate amount, however, Medicaid paid for nearly
10% of the services provided in the nation's acute care hospitals. Id.
177 See Rosenblatt, supra note 30, at 280-81.
178 There are a number of reasons for this reluctance. Both programs allegedly impose
burdensome paperwork on providers seeking reimbursement. In particular, Medicaid reim-
bursement payments are delayed for many months in some states. Both programs also reimburse
hospitals on the basis of a complicated assessment of "reasonable costs." The result is that
facilities often receive for their services an amount somewhat less than the rate they charge to
some private-pay patients for the same services.
The impact of Medicaid and Medicare reimbursement on a facility's willingness to take
these patients is complicated by the fact that reimbursement of physicians for services rendered to
patients in hospitals is separate from reimbursement to the hospital and, particularly under
Medicaid, often far less than the physician's customary charges. See Rosenblatt, supra note 30, at
280-81. For a good analysis of this problem, see D. ROWLAND, PHYSICIAN PAYMENT: ASSURING
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The definition of ability to pay as illustrated in the regulations also severe-
ly limits the use of pre-admission cash deposits. While not prohibited by the
regulations, deposits cannot be used where the effect it to exclude people who
do not have cash but who could pay on an installment basis, or people from
whom some other form of payment "probably" could be collected.1 79 In addi-
tion, if a facility admits only those patients who are referred by members of the
hospital's medical staff - a practice employed by virtually all non-teaching
hositals - the facility must provide an alternative means for admitting people
who are otherwise admissible under the regulations but who do not have a per-
sonal physician on the facility's staff.
180
As the foregoing examination of the development of the community serv-
ice regulations indicates, the community service regulations of 1979 impose
conditions on recipient facilities which are far more concrete than the vague
conditions imposed by the 1947 regulations. The critical issue is whether such
regulations are a valid exercise of administrative authority.
B. Challenges to the 1979 Regulations
Critics of the present charity care regulations have argued that the regula-
tions are invalid because they exceed the scope of authority allowed by the
statute. In addition, they argue, the regulations cannot be applied retroactively
without impairing the contract or property rights of recipient facilities.
The question of whether the 1947 regulations exceed the scope of the
statute depends upon an interpretation of the 1946 legislation. If the original
statute allows a broad interpretation, as this article contends,""1 then so would
the reiterated language in the 1947 regulations. Accordingly, there is no legal
principle18 2 or compelling argument in equity183 which would prevent an agen-
cy, through rule-making or adjudication, from defining a vague statutory con-
AccEss AND CONTAINING COST (published by the Legal Services Corporation, March, 1980).
179 The regulations do not prohibit "cash only" or "pre-admission cash" policies, as
was considered by HEW at the time the regulations were imposed, but instead attempt to limit
the use of such policies when they tend to exclude some people who arguably can pay, but not in
cash. See 42 C.F.R. § 124.603(d)(3) (1980), cited in full at note 172 supra. The critical term
"probably can pay" is unquestionably vague but does indicate the intent of the regulation, if not
its exact meaning. It is certain, therefore, to be the focus of enforcement problems. See 44 Fed.
Reg. 29,399 (1979).
180 42 C.F.R. § 124.603(d)(1) (1980).
181 See text at notes 91-100 supra.
182 Whether dealing with an interpretation embodied in a subsequent interpretive
regulation, or an interpretation incident to an individual enforcement action, an administrative
agency has broad discretion to interpret the substantive standards incorporated in prior regula-
tions, limited only by the usual requirement that an interpretation be reasonable and within the
scope of the statute that created the administrative authority. See United States v. Larionoff, 431
U.S. 864, 869-73 (1977); Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1965). Indeed, "extra weight
may be given to an interpretive rule because of such factors as agency specialization, statutory re-
enactment, contemporary construction, and longstanding effectiveness." K. DAVIs, ADMINI-
STRATrVE LAW OF THE SEVENTIES § 5.05, 162 (1976). These factors arguably apply to the pres-
ent inquiry.
183 See text at notes 187-88 infra.
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dition. 184 If it were determined, however, that the original statute allows only a
narrow interpretation, then expansive definitions of statutory terms, such as
the 1979 regulations, might be invalid as applied to facilities that received
funds while the 1947 regulations were in effect.
A similar analysis must be applied to determine whether the 1979 regula-
tions impair the contract or property rights of Hill-Burton recipients prior to
1964 by imposing retroactive conditions upon them. 185 The essence of the
critic's argument is that subsequent administrative action established a new
condition that was not part of the original transaction that created vested in-
terests on the part of Hill-Burton recipients. If, rather than creating a new con-
dition, however, the 1979 regulations merely delineated a vague, existing
statutory condition, then the administrative action should withstand judicial
scrutiny on constitutional or equitable grounds.186
Both inquiries, therefore, principally turn on the characterization of the
"available to all" language which appears in the original statute and in the
1947 regulations. If this language is viewed as a vague condition allowing
subsequent interpretation, the broad interpretation of the statute and of the
original regulation may be upheld as an act within the scope of the agency's
authority. Consequently, the subsequent specification of conditions created by
the provision would also be upheld. Yet if the statutory language is viewed nar-
rowly, any subsequent regulation or administrative interpretation defining
community service in its broader sense would be tantamount to the creation of
a new obligation. Whether phrased in constitutional terms or simply in terms
of equity, the creation of what is viewed by the courts as a new condition, and
184 See note 130 supra.
185 If a subsequent administrative action to enforce a new condition is applied after the
receipt of funds and is viewed as impairing established property or contract rights, constitutional
principles may require that the administrative action be judicially examined, perhaps even close-
ly scrutinized. There is substantial authority that suggests that a subsequent interpretation of a
statute or regulation that is in effect a retroactive change in a previous interpretation may be in-
valid, particularly under circumstances where individuals affected by the change can claim
detrimental reliance on the initial interpretation. See Automobile Club of Mich. v. Commissioner
of Internal Revenue, 353 U.S. 180, 183 (1957); Helvering v. Griffiths, 318 U.S. 371, 403 (1943);
Manhattan Gen. Equip. Co. v. Commissioner, 297 U.S. 129, 134 (1936). See also NLRB v.
Pease Oil Co., 279 F.2d 135, 139 (2d Cir. 1960). See Vanderbilt Note, supra note 30, at 1480-94.
But note that the reasoning of these cases applies to interpretations that are both retroactive in
their application and alterations of previous interpretations, not further specifications of a vague
or unsettled rule. See K. DAvis, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TEXT § 5.09 (1959).
A subsequent interpretation of the 1947 community service regulation to clarify its
meaning would not be a change in a previously stated rule but a clarification of a vaguely termed
requirement. It might not even be retroactive in effect, depending upon such factors as the cir-
cumstances of the subsequent interpretation, and the terms of remedial measures required for
non-complying facilities. Similarly, and more importantly, as discussed in the text at notes
205-25 infra, the 1979 regulations interpreting the 1964 community service regulations were in-
tended only to clarify further, not alter retroactively, previously established rules. For that mat-
ter, since the general thrust of the enforcement provisions incorporated in the 1979 community
service regulations is to require remedial steps to facilitate future compliance - there is no deficit
"makeup" or punitive sanction authority - the new regulations may be viewed as prospective
in their actual impact.
186 See note 182 supra.
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its retroactive application to previous recipients of funds is unlikely to with-
stand judicial scrutiny.
187
Turning to an analysis of the Hill-Burton legislation itself, it would be dif-
ficult for a court to conclude that the regulations issued in 1947 allow the en-
forcement of a community service obligation as subsequently specified in 1979
- at least as applied to facilities that received funding after 1946 but before
1964.188 A court possibly could find that by enacting the original "available to
all" language, Congress created statutory language with the intent of allowing
subsequent administration discretion to dictate the scope of its meaning; it
would be more difficult to find that the administrative agency in 1947 had a
similar intent in issuing the "available to all" regulations, particularly when
viewed after three decades of inaction.
None of these criticisms apply, however, to the validity of administrative
attempts to establish a broadly defined community service obligation or, more
particularly, to the validity of the 1979 regulations when considered in light of
the 1964 amendments 189 to the "available to all" statutory language or the
regulations issued thereafter. 190 The amended "available to all" provision in-
cluded in the 1964 legislation and the legislative history of that amended
language offer a clear picture of congressional intent to authorize a broadly in-
terpreted "available to all" requirement. 191 Significantly, that authority was
exercised immediately following the enactment of the 1964 amendment, and in
a manner that left no doubt as to HEW's interpretation of Congress' intent. 19
2
As summarized earlier, under the regulations issued in 1964 following the
statutory amendment, recipient facilities were prohibited from discrimination
on the basis of race, creed, color, or national origin, 193 and required to provide
187 This is only assuming that the new interpretations would be applied retroactively,
i.e., to facilities that had received Hill-Burton assistance before the issuance of a new interpreta-
tion. Had the federal agency subsequent to 1947 (and prior to 1964) issued new community serv-
ice regulations to be applied to future applicants, strong arguments could be made that this was
in accordance with the discretion created in the 1946 statute. See note 178 supra. This would have
eliminated the basis for a constitutional or equitable objection to community service enforce-
ment, since all future applicants would be aware of the interpretation of the condition at the time
of receipt of funds. See text at note 185 supra.
188 Virtually all courts that have considered the validity of a community service obligation
as derived from the 1946 statute or 1947 regulations have come to this conclusion. See American
Hosp. Ass'n v. Harris, 625 F.2d 1328, 1342-43 (7th Cir. 1980) (Fell, J., concurring and dissent-
ing); Perry v. Greater Southeast Wash. Community Hosp. Found., No. 721-71 at 5 (D.D.C.
June 28, 1972).
189 See text at notes 44-47 and 104-06 supra.
190 It must be noted that the 1964 amendments, by explicit provision of that legislation,
apply only to recipients of funds after 1964. See Pub. L. No. 88-443, § 3(b), 78 Stat. 462 (1964).
Thus, facilities that received funds prior to 1964 could only be held to whatever obligation was
created by the statute and regulations that existed prior to that date.
Notwithstanding, there were a substantial number of hospitals and other health facilities
that received Hill-Burton assistance after 1964. According to HEW estimates, 1742 projects were
funded from 1966 through 1971, at a cost of nearly $944 million. DHEW, HILL-BURTON PROJ-
ECT REPORT 29 (1972).
191 See text at notes 107-18 supra.
"I See Cook v. Ochsner Found. Hosp., 61 F.R.D. 354, 360 (E.D. La. 1972).
193 More correctly, the 1964 regulations prohibited discrimination based on creed, ard
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community service, explicitly defined in the text of the regulations as making
"services . . . available to the general public, or . . . limited only on the
basis of age, medical indigency or type or kind of medical or mental
disability." 194 Without further administrative interpretation the 1964 regula-
tions may have been insufficiently specific to allow for independent judicial en-
forcement, absent agency action? 95 For that matter, the definition of com-
munity service includes some perplexing language. 1 96 Yet the substantive
parameters of the obligation created are clearly defined: after 1964 recipient
facilities were to provide their services to any member of the public, except for
people who are excepted under the community service definition. This defini-
tion included among those excepted from the community service definition the
medically indigent, meaning, presumably, people who cannot pay their
medical bills. 197
There can be little room to argue that these regulations were beyond the
scope of the discretion created by the 1964 legislation or that the general mean-
ing of these regulations is unclear. 198 Therefore, at the very least, facilities that
received funds after the 1964 regulations were issued should be bound to com-
ply with any reasonable administrative application of these substantive stand-
ards. 199 Any subsequent regulations or administrative action interpreting the
drew attention to the Civil Rights Act of 1964 which prohibited discrimination based on race, col-
or, or national origin. See notes 77-79 supra and explanation at note 158 supra.
194 For the full text, see notes 134 and 136 supra.
195 See note 146 supra and note 199 infra. From the viewpoint of administrative enforce-
ment, the 1964 regulations obviously had major problems, most particularly the failure to specify
the procedures by which these requirements would be applied and enforced. Presumably, state
Hill-Burton agencies were expected to monitor compliance as they monitored compliance with
the other requirements imnosed on recipient facilities. Subsequent experience indicated,
however, that the states were either unwilling or unable to do so, see note 150 supra, justifying
later amendments to these regulations in 1974 and 1979. See notes 202 and 208-17 infra. While
the failure to specify the method of application of these requirements may well have been a
political signal to recipients that the federal government had a lax attitude towards enforcement,
it is hardly a basis for the creation of ajudicially enforceable expectation of nonenforcement. For
that matter, without further amendment to the regulations or specific delineation of enforcement
procedures, HEW could have undertaken to enforce these regulations, or asked states to do so,
using general administrative procedures and standards developed on a case-by-case basis.
196 For example, it is not clear what is meant by allowing limitation of services based on
age. See note 136 supra. In recent years "age discrimination" has come to mean primarily
discrimination against older people. Was this intended by the 1964 regulation? Or at the other
extreme, was this an exception merely to allow such institutions as children's hospitals to receive
Hill-Burton assistance without violating the community service obligation? There is nothing in
the administrative or legislative history further specifying the meaning of this exception, or in-
dicating what was intended by this language.
197 It is important in this context to note that community service was one of two charity
care obligations; the other, the requirement of uncompensated service, defines the amount of
service recipient facilities must provide free or below cost; uncompensated service is a separate
and distinct obligation, but one which must be read together with community service. For a
lengthy discussion, see Rose, supra note 30.
98 See text at notes 167-75 supra.
199 Cook v. Ochsner Found. Hosp., 61 F.R.D. at 360. The court in Perry, though critical
of the enforceability of the community service regulations by judicial process, nonetheless
recognized the validity of the obligation created by the 1964 statute and subsequent regulations.
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conditions created by the 1964 regulations would be valid as applied retro-
actively to 1964 in monitoring or enforcing compliance by post-1964 recipients
of assistance. Therefore, if subsequent regulations are a reasonable ad-
ministrative application of the substantive standards outlined in the 1964
legislation and regulations, they are neither an invalid exercise of ad-
ministrative authority, nor a retroactive application of a new condition.
Turning to the 1974 community service regulations, 200 the validity of
which went unchallenged by the hospital industry, it seems clear that they are
valid extensions of the 1964 amendments and regulations. In requiring recip-
ient facilities to participate in Medicaid and Medicare and to take "such steps
as necessary" to insure that Medicaid and Medicare recipients were admitted
without discrimination, the 1974 regulations did not create a new obligation.
20 1
Rather, they were an interpretation by HEW of the substantive obligation
created by statute in 1964 with specific reference to one form of payment which
experience had indicated presented a substantial enforcement problem. 2 2 In
fact, HEW was making such a specification under a court order to issue further
interpretative regulations providing for the enforcement of the obligation
created in 1964 and specifying that the obligation required facilities to be
available to Medicaid or Medicare recipients. 20
3
The 1974 regulations are vulnerable to criticism for failing to incorporate
into the substantive interpretation of "available to all" a clear statement of
how compliance with the obligation would be monitored and enforced. 20 4 For
SeePerryv. Greater Southeast Wash. Hosp. Found., No. 721-71 at 6 (D.D.C.June 28, 1979). In
fact, after noting that the 1964 community service regulations were lacking in enforceable stand-
ards - meaning standards that would allow judicial enforcement of the obligation absent agency
action - the court strongly urged HEW to issue clarifying regulations. Id. at 7. This strongly im-
plies the court's belief in the validity of the 1964 statute and regulations and the need for further
specification of enforcement standards and procedures.
Similarly Judge Pell's dissent in Harris, while quite critical of HEW's interpretation of
uncompensated service, limits his criticism of the community service as interpreted in 1979 to the
narrow issue of the adequacy of the methods of enforcement. American Hosp. Ass'n v. Harris,
625 F.2d at 1342-43. See note 217 infra. Unfortunately, some critics have failed to consider the
impact of the 1964 regulations. For example, the elaborate chart of Hill-Burton regulations found
in the Vanderbilt Note, supra note 30, at 1057, omits any reference to the 1964 regulations. Such
consideration is necessary for an accurate assessment of the validity of later regulations.
200 See text at notes 146-49 supra.
201 HEW explicitly stated in the introduction to the 1974 regulations that the new
regulations were only intended to make previously established requirements of community serv-
ice more explicit. 39 Fed. Reg. 31,766 (1974).
202 HEW had substantial basis for issuing further regulations. Experience had indicated
that further specification of "available to all" was necessary to deal with the type of circum-
stances that would likely be presented in compliance review. See examples cited in Rosenblatt,
supra note 30, at 270-71 n.104-06. The need for further specification of the obligation was also
noted by many witnesses testifying on the uncompensated service regulations issued in 1972-73.
See 37 Fed. Reg. 14,719 (1973).
203 In Cook v. Ochsner Found. Hosp., 61 F.R.D. 354 (E.D. La. 1972), HEW was
ordered to issue new interpretive regulations allowing for the enforcement of community service
and specifically required to indicate whether community service included service to Medicaid
and Medicare recipients. Id. at 360-61. See also cases cited in note 146 supra.
204 As mentioned before, the original regulations can also be criticized for failing to pro-
vide methods for monitoring compliance other than delegating compliance responsibility to state
agencies in to, without any specification or delineation of this responsibility. See text at notes
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example, while it was made explicit in 1974 that Medicaid recipients are within
the broad category of people for whom Hill-Burton facilities must be made
available, the 1974 regulations are conspicuously silent concerning the
methods by which this availability would be measured. It is not clear under the
1974 regulations if a facility must merely show it had no policy or intent to
discriminate against Medicaid recipients or whether it must prove Medicaid
recipients were in fact provided services in order to comply with the community
service requirement.
The same issues can be raised with regard to any group or individual
within the broad protection apparently secured by the community service
obligation. Without further specification, it is not clear whether the agency in-
terpreted the obligation to be merely a negative injunction on "classical"
discrimination, or an affirmative obligation to provide service to certain
groups. Consequently, compliance with the community service obligation
could be realistically determined only on an ad hoc, case-by-case basis, if at all,
and not by reference to any administrative interpretation of the standard of
compliance. Such a situation is hardly beneficial either to the public or to any
Hill-Burton recipient that sought to make a good faith effort to comply with
their obligations.
By further specifying the substantive standards enunciated in 1964, the
1979 regulations respond to the fundamental criticisms of the 1974
regulations, 205 and increase the likelihood for more uniform and realistic com-
munity service enforcement activities. The essential substantive20 6 elements of
the new regulations, as outlined earlier, 20 7 define the principle of "available to
all" in terms far more detailed than the perplexing explication of the 1964
regulations, or the 1974 amendments, and describe quite specifically how those
substantive standards should be applied and enforced particularly with regard
to certain circumstances.
Most importantly, the 1979 regulations clarify the general prohibition on
discrimination 208 against people who have the ability to pay. As discussed
earlier the regulations adopted an "effects" test for determining compliance
133-38 and note 195 supra.
205 See citation to HEW's explanation of the need for further regulations at notes 155-58
supra. HEW was also responding to criticism Congress leveled during consideration of the 1974
legislation, see note 153 supra, and to various issues raised by consumer lawsuits, see note 154
supra.
206 The essential procedural element in the 1979 regulations, of course, is the
"federalization" of the enforcement activities. See notes 156 and 195 supra. The 1974 regulations
had delegated virtually all responsibility for enforcement and monitoring and enforcing com-
pliance to the state Hill-Burton agencies, without any specification of the means or procedures to
be followed. Presumably, no one challenges the authority of the federal administrative agency to
amend the community service obligation in this manner, particularly after the 1974 and 1979
legislative mandates to HEW to do so. See notes 14-15 and 121-29 supra. Nonetheless, the impact
of this change in the regulations could be as substantial as any other aspect of the 1979 regula-
tions.
207 See notes 159-80 supra.
208 As noted earlier, the regulations also add a final note of clarity to the prohibition on
discrimination against Medicaid and Medicare as stated in the 1974 regulations. See notes 169
and 174 supra.
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with the substantive obligation of community service, 20 9 and illustrate both ap-
plications of that test and remedial steps that would be sought if a facility were
not in compliance.
210
For example, the regulations make it clear that if a decision or practice by
a member of the recipient facility's medical staff has the effect of excluding
anyone from the facility who is a Medicaid or Medicare recipient, or who has
any other ability to pay, then the facility must take some measure to provide for
the admission of that person by alternative means. 211 This approach avoids the
difficulty of divining an overt policy or specific intent from the complexity of
relationships inherent in the modem health facility - a concession to ad-
ministrative convenience - while also avoiding the hardship of holding the
recipient facility necessarily responsible for the actions of any one individual
physician, or even a group of physicians. 21 2 It does, however, require a facility
to take steps to insure compliance 21 3 where those actions result in a measurable
effect on the total services provided by the institution as a whole. Thus, the
regulations clarify the application of community service in such a way as to
both anticipate and allow voluntary compliance and facilitate realistic enforce-
ment activities.
For similar reasons, the 1979 regulations address the issue of access to
recipient facilities by people who have the ability to pay for services but do not
have a personal physician on the facility's medical staff. Such individuals are
often effectively denied admission by the traditional practice in most non-
teaching hospitals of admitting patients only on the order of a member of the
facility's medical staff. The 1979 regulations again rely on the pragmatic "ef-
fects" test. The regulations do not go so far as to prohibit the traditional prac-
tice, but only require that a Hill-Burton facility make alternative arrangements
for the admission of any person otherwise admissible but without a personal
physician.
214
209 42 C.F.R. 124.603(a)-(d) (1980). See note 164 supra.
210 See text at notes 172-80 supra.
211 See text of 42 C.F.R. § 124.603(d)(2) (1980) and note 172 supra.
212 It must be noted that the 1979 regulations, for the first time, directly refer to the
problem of medical staff physicians. Given the virtually complete control physicians exercise over
admissions in most hospitals, it is hard to believe that earlier federal or state regulations could
have avoided addressing how the actions or policies of physicians would be considered in deter-
mining compliance of the facilities in which they practice. The text of the 1979 regulations and
the explanatory material that accompanied the issuance of the regulations explain both the legal
basis for this new and, finally, realistic interpretation of "community service" and the policies
behind it. See 44 Fed. Reg. 29,399 (1979).
While neither the hospital industry nor the medical profession may be comfortable with
the specific reference to this sensitive issue, this approach seems on its face to be both a
reasonable and a practical approach to community service enforcement, making some concession
to administrative convenience but also avoiding the harsher implications of holding a facility
responsible for any physician's conduct per se. In any event, it is a vast improvement over
previous regulations which, somehow, chose to ignore this critical issue.
213 See notes 172-73 supra.
214 42 C.F.R. § 124.603(d)(1) (1980). A similar approach is also taken to the issue of
pre-admission or "cash only" deposits. The practice is not prohibited per se, but where the prac-
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The specification of the standards by which the community service obliga-
tion would be measured, and the illustrations of its application, are buttressed
by the delineation - again for the first time in the federal regulations - of
remedial steps that may be required of a facility that fails to provide communi-
ty service. 215 While broaching sensitive issues, the regulations again come to
grips with an issue that without specification would make individual com-
pliance or enforcement extremely unlikely. Furthermore, the specified
remedies are stated in such a manner as to make considerable concession to the
practical problems that a facility may encounter in gaining the cooperation of
its medical staff.216 Non-complying facilities are not required to alter ad-
ministration of their facility or to require compliance with the requirements of
community service by their medical staff in any particular way. In keeping
with the "effects" test, Hill-Burton facilities are only required to make alter-
native arrangements that will result in admission of those people who are pro-
tected by community service, but who are excluded by the practices or policies
of the institution or its medical staff; recipient facilities are not given a list of ex-
clusive remedies that they must adopt, but are given specific examples of the
kind of remedial steps which could be taken or that could be required if the
facility fails to develop an acceptable alternative.
21 7
The 1979 regulations may have been written with unprecedented specifici-
ty and therefore have served as an invitation to controversy, but they were also
necessary prerequisites to the enforcement of the obligation. This is hardly a
matter of speculation, given the experience of the last several decades. Nor is it
even a matter exclusively for the judgment of the federal administrative agen-
cy. Repeated judicial, administrative, and legislative inquiries into the mean-
ing of community service and state and federal enforcement of that obligation
have come to the same conclusion: additional interpretive regulations and ad-
ditional specification of the procedures by which the obligation would be
monitored and enforced were clearly required. Indeed, further regulations
were mandated by the courts and by Congress.
tice has the effect of excluding people who "probably" can pay, alternative arrangements must
be made. 42 G.F.R. § 124.603(d)(3) (1980). See note 179 supra.
215 See 42 C.F.R. 5 124.603(d)(1)(i-v) and § 124.603(d)(2)(i-v) (1980).
216 This may be especially important for facilities that have considerable trouble gaining
the cooperation of medical staff physicians, particularly in regions of the country where the short-
age of physicians gives the facility little choice but to offer privileges to non-cooperating physi-
cians.
217 Surprisingly, the dissent in American Hasp. Ass'n v. Harris, criticizes this aspect of the
new "community service" regulations. Indeed, this is apparently the only faultJudge Pell found
with the community service regulations promulgated in 1979. He had a number of objections to
the uncompensated service regulations. 625 F.2d at 1343. Judge Pell found the enumeration of
examples of compliance as tantamount to requiring those exemplified activities as the only proper
form of remedy. HEW's explanation of the regulations that accompanied the issuance of the
regulations effectively rebuts this assertion, and lays out a rationale for this approach. See 44 Fed.
Reg. 29,398 (1979). Essentially, the agency was trying to avoid tying the hands of facilities while
attempting to clarify remedial steps-a legitimate concern given that any community service en-
forcement would be unprecedented by administrative experience.
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The statutory basis created in 1964, and exercised by regulation shortly
thereafter, without looking further, seems to have created sufficient authority
for these regulations.218 In addition, Congress in 1974219 and again in 1979220
specifically applauded - and virtually required - efforts to issue further inter-
pretive community services regulations. Significantly, none of those authorities
questioned the statutory authority of HEW to issue further interpretive regula-
tions, nor did they note any constitutional barriers to their promulgation.2 21
Moreover, the circumstances which allow the argument that ad-
ministrative agencies are prohibited from retroactively imposing obligations or
altering those previously established are not presented, 222 at least on the face of
the regulations as enacted in 1979. That is, HEW attempted only to specify the
obligations created in 1964 and provide for monitoring and enforcement of
compliance. Thus, the agency did not create new conditions for post-1964
recipients.
In short, if the 1979 regulations interpreting community service were
anything less than they are, that is, if the critical issues of compliance standards
and remedies had not been addressed in specific terms, it would be hard to
imagine any realistic federal monitoring or enforcement activities. Without
these regulations, community service would mean little more than what each
facility would choose it to mean. Moreover, in issuing the 1979 regulations,
HEW supported the exercise of discretion with considerable documentation, 2 3
particularly with regard to the need for further specification of the standards of
compliance and the procedures for enforcement. 224 As argued earlier, HEW
was entitled to wide discretion in adding further specifications to the 1964 and
1974 regulations for the purpose of clarifying the meaning of community serv-
ice as applied to specific circumstances and to facilitate an enforcement pro-
gram.2 25 Viewed as such, the new regulations did not create new obligations or
alter previously established policies.
Given the nature of these regulations federal officials could hardly be sur-
prised by the controversy they have spawned. These regulations create, for the
218 See notes 107-18 supra.
219 See notes 120-25 supra.
220 See notes 126-29 supra.
221 The Maryland Note, supra note 30, at 337-69, seems to argue that HEW, then the
courts, and finally the Congress misinterpreted the federal statute. In particular the author ac-
cused Congress as falling prey to "emotional" arguments in 1974 and attempting to enact sub
rosa a form of national health insurance by twisting the meaning of the charity care obligation.
Whatever merit this undocumented and somewhat novel political analysis may have, it hardly
suffices as a method of statutory interpretation. Presumably even when reading a legislative
enactment of an "emotional" Congress, one is still attempting to determine what Congress,
emotional or otherwise, intended to enact.
222 See text at notes 185-86 supra.
223 See note 157 supra.
224 Note, however, that the issue of statutory authority presents a more formidable bar-
rier to enforcement if applied to facilities that received funds prior to 1964. See notes 182-87
supra.
225 See discussion of agency discretion at note 182 supra.
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first time, the prospect for realistic enforcement of the assurance of community
service given by recipient facilities for at least a decade. Unlike earlier efforts,
these regulations establish that enforcement will require far more than pro for-
ma assurances or paper compliance. Community service will require, if enforced
in the spirit in which the new regulations were written, that facilities provide
their services to everyone in their communities without discrimination.
Admittedly there is some element of inequity present. The vague state-
ment of the obligation and the obvious omission of reference to compliance
standards in earlier regulations may have created the unstated expectation that
compliance with community service would not be closely monitored. This in-
equity, however, must be weighed against the benefits that will be created by
community service enforcement, benefits that have been recognized and sup-
ported in law but unenforced for at least two decades. It is the consumer public
that can make the far greater case of inequity: the continued failure of state and
federal government to make any attempt to monitor or enforce the legally
recognized right to community service. Should the federal government retreat
from its apparent willingness to pursue community service enforcement, the
controversy sparked by the objections of recipient facilities would only be
replaced by a re-initiation of the consumer efforts that originally prodded the
federal government to enforce community service.
226
CONCLUSION
The Hill-Burton program marked the beginning of federal involvement in
mainstream medical care. By conditioning the receipt of facility construction
funds on compliance with certain statutory requirements, Congress hoped to
increase the availability of institutionally-based health care in areas where serv-
ices had been shown to be lacking. Among those requirements were so-called
"charity care" provisions, requiring funded facilities to engage in a reasonable
volume of uncompensated health care and to provide community service.
Despite a congressional mandate in 1964 that re-affirmed congressional sup-
port for the community service obligation, both federal and state ad-
ministrative agencies largely ignored Congress' intent. Regulations issued in
1964 did little to facilitate enforcement of this obligation; nor did 1974 regula-
tions. Finally, in 1979, the most comprehensive explanation of the "communi-
226 It should be noted that enforcement of the assurances given as conditions to Hill-
Burton grants and loans is only one of several ways that this obligation could be recognized. A
similar "community service" obligation is also imposed on all non-profit health facilities as part
of the quid pro quo for receipt of tax-exempt status. Indeed, a government effort to enforce this
obligation would affect more health facilities than enforcement of the assurnces of Hill-Burton
facilities.
It is also conceivable that a community service obligation could be made a condition
of licensure, at least in jurisdictions where the enabling legislation created sufficient authority in
the licensing agency. See New Jersey Assoc. of Health Facilities v. Finley, 83 NJ. 67, 415 A.2d
1147 (1980), cert. denied, sub. nom. Wayne Haven Nursing Home, et al. v. Finley, 449 U.S. 944
(1980).
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ty service" obligation of the Hill-Burton program and its successor program
was issued by HEW. The regulations, through their specific instructions, made
enforcement of the statutory and regulatory requirements a practical possibility
for the first time. These regulations, critical to the implementation of the Hill-
Burton program's legislative and regulatory framework, are clearly within the
discretionary authority granted to federal agencies to implement federal pro-
grams. The regulations are not an embodiment of new conditions to be imposed
retroactively on funded facilities, but rather stand as the first serious attempt to
implement a congressional directive first issued over three decades ago. To
deny their validity would not be just to ignore a congressionally-mandated pro-
gram - it would be to subvert it.
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